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 Introduction
Dear reader,
We are proud to present a new study on the European 
national parliaments’ involvement in European poli-
cy-making, it is a first of its kind. The authors, Katrin 
Auel and Christine Neuhold, have analysed the differ-
ent dimensions of this topic with great care and love 
for detail, thus creating a body of research that will be 
valuable both to academics and to practitioners. 
Strong and reliable involvement of national parliaments 
in European policy-making is certainly not just a matter 
of convenience. It addresses an extremely important 
aspect of the EU’s democratic legitimacy. As the study 
shows, many national parliaments have come to see that 
a more effective national scrutiny of their governments’ 
EU activities and closer relations with the European 
Parliament is a way of increasing their influence on 
EU policy-making and ensuring at the same time that 
Europe remains built on democratic principles. Close 
relations with the national parliaments are also ben-
eficial for the European Parliament by enhancing its 
legitimacy and bringing Europe closer to the citizens.
Over recent years, the national parliaments’ role in the 
European Union has been ‘upgraded’ in a number of 
ways. The study highlights the different approaches that 
national parliaments have been taking, compares their 
relative efficiency and effectiveness, looks at weakness-
es, extrapolates best practices and thereby promotes 
the Europeanisation of national parliaments. 
Sometimes in the past, there have been attempts to play 
off national parliaments against the European Parlia-
ment. On the one side, where such efforts succeeded, 
they weakened parliamentary oversight of European 
cooperation by executive branches of government. On 
the other side, where national parliaments have played 
their roles with self-confidence, it has oftentimes con-
tributed to educating the respective national public 
about European affairs and has allowed citizens to have 
a better say on European decisions through their na-
tional representatives besides the European Parliament 
members. It would therefore be enriching for our Eu-
ropean system of a multilayer democracy. 
If a continuous and effective cooperation between na-
tional parliaments and the European Parliament should 
become the norm, comprehensive involvement of na-
tional parliaments is an obvious pre-requisite. Ideally, 
we should build a “phalanx of parliaments” as one pillar 
of European democracy. 
May this study contribute to this lofty goal and encour-
age future cooperation between many political actors 
concerned. 
 
Yours, 
Reinhard Bütikofer, MEP 
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Executive summary 
Over the last years, the role of national parliaments 
(NP) in the European Union (EU) has been ‘upgraded’ 
in a number of ways, most importantly through the 
introduction of the Early Warning System (EWS) and 
a new role in treaty revisions in the Treaty of Lisbon 
(TEU). In addition to their traditional role of scruti-
nising the government in EU affairs, these provisions 
formally turn national legislatures into EU actors in 
their own right that can act both individually and col-
lectively at the EU level as well as, in most cases, for-
mally independently of their national governments. As 
a result, the EU legislative process now presents them 
with multiple arenas they can be simultaneously ac-
tive in. Against this background, this study examines 
how national parliaments have resorted to the different 
tools at their disposal within the different arenas in the 
practical political process. 
Parliamentary involvement within  
the domestic arena
When it comes to traditional scrutiny, i.e. controlling 
the government within EU affairs at the Member 
State level, scrutiny provisions are now more similar, 
but far from uniform, across the EU member states. All 
national parliaments have set up one or more European 
Affairs Committees (EAC), but great differences still 
remain regarding the involvement of other standing 
committees in EU affairs. Similarly, we can find vari-
ation with regard to the scrutiny approach. Although 
the addressee of the scrutiny procedure is, in the end, 
always the government, systems differ with regard to 
whether parliament scrutinises EU documents or the 
government position for the negotiations in the Council 
or both. A number of studies have classified and ranked 
national parliaments according to their institutional 
strength in EU affairs. Accordingly one can identify a 
group of strong, mainly North European, parliaments 
including those of Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, but 
also Germany, the Netherlands and Austria. In contrast, 
rather weak parliaments can be found in Southern mem-
ber states Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain, 
but also in Belgium and Luxembourg. France, Italy and 
the UK fall somewhere in between. Finally, the new 
constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe tend to 
accord a greater role for legislatures, and in contrast 
to their West European counterparts, many of their 
parliaments can – at least with regard to their formal 
institutional position – be considered as rather strong.
Comparative studies on how national parliaments ac-
tually make use of their institutional provisions in the 
practical process are, however, still rare. The only study 
providing empirical data on all parliamentary activities 
in all chambers across the EU (Auel et al. 2015) that ex-
ists shows that the powerful parliaments of Denmark, 
Finland, Germany and Sweden are also the most active, 
followed by the Austrian, Dutch, Estonian, Italian and 
Lithuanian parliaments. 
When it comes to controlling the respective minister(s) 
in the Council, note that in only eight member states 
must the government obtain a mandate from parlia-
ment before being able to take a position in the Council, 
namely in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Sweden 
(COSAC 2017a). In other member states, parliaments 
can decide to issue mandates or resolutions and must be 
given adequate time to do so. With the notable excep-
tion of the Austrian Nationalrat, the German Bundesrat 
(in areas falling into the jurisdiction of the Länder) and 
the Estonian Riigikogu, mandates are, however, nor-
mally not legally binding. Even non-binding mandates 
can, however, have a strong politically binding effect, 
especially if the government is obliged to report and 
justify any deviations from the parliamentary opinion. 
This is the case in the parliaments of Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Sweden. 
Parliaments do not only try to scrutinise the activities 
of their representative in the Council but also within 
the European Council, an institution that plays a role 
of increasing importance within the EU. A number of 
parliaments have set up formal rules relating specifical-
ly to these meetings, either in the Constitution or the 
parliamentary rules of procedure (Wessels et al 2013). 
This is the case in Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden. In most cases, 
the rules mainly describe the government’s obligations 
towards the parliament regarding information on up-
coming or concluded meetings. 
The contribution of national parliaments to the demo-
cratic legitimacy of the EU cannot, however, be meas-
ured solely by parliamentary influence and control but 
also by extent to which they assume the role of public 
forum by communicating and making EU affairs 
public. Here we (also) see great variation across par-
liaments, the number of hours spent on overall plenary 
debates per year ranges from around three hundred 
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hours in the Austrian Nationalrat to over one thousand 
hours in the Dutch Tweede Kamer or the UK House of 
Commons. 
In addition to plenary activities provision of information 
via their websites are an important means of national 
parliaments to communicate EU issues to their citizens. 
In a recent Conference of Parliamentary Committees 
for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union 
(COSAC) report (of 2016), almost all parliaments stated 
that they used their websites regularly to provide infor-
mation related to EU affairs to the public. Best practice 
examples include the websites of the French Assemblée 
Nationale, the Danish Folketing, the Polish Sejm, or the 
Swedish Riksdag. Here, the parliaments have estab-
lished genuine EU websites that provide comprehensive 
information on and direct links to parliamentary activi-
ties and documents, including parliamentary resolutions 
and reports on EU affairs or EU plenary debates, links 
to other EU related websites such as those of the EU 
institutions, the current EU presidency, COSAC or the 
InterParliamentary EU information eXchange (IPEX).
Parliamentary involvement within the EU arena 
As not all of the Lisbon Treaty provisions on national 
parliaments have been used yet, we thus focus on the 
simplified Treaty revisions, the Early Warning System 
(EWS) and the Political Dialogue as well as inter-par-
liamentary cooperation. 
The simplified Treaty revision procedure has been 
used on three occasions so far: to amend the Protocol 
on Transitional Provisions annexed to the EU, the Pro-
tocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Trea-
ty of Lisbon and in order to add a third paragraph to 
Article 136 Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) enabling the member states of the Eu-
rozone to establish the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). Neither of these amendments has been vetoed 
by a national parliament, but they have all been subject 
to parliamentary scrutiny and, where applicable, went 
through a ratification process. 
When it comes to the EWS, some national chambers 
have made very frequent use of the instrument, but 
participation varies across member states. Based on 
the numbers provided by the European commission in 
its annual reports, the EWS has generated overall 354 
opinions during the period from 2010 to 2016. During 
these six years, the Swedish parliament has emerged as 
the ‘front-runner’ when it comes to the use of the tool, 
followed by the French Sénat, the Austrian Bundesrat, 
the Dutch Tweede Kamer, the UK House of Commons 
and the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés. It is note-
worthy that NP have been able to act together collec-
tively in EU affairs and have so far issued three ‘yellow 
cards’. These have been issued on the proposal for the 
so-called ‘Monti II’ Regulation, on the Regulation on 
the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office and most recently on the Posted Workers Direc-
tive. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the three yel-
low cards demonstrate that NP are not only prepared 
to put the tools to use, but also coordinate across na-
tional borders.
When looking at the use of the Political Dialogue, a 
differentiated picture emerges, just like with the EWS. 
Some parliaments such as the Portuguese Assembleia 
have made extensive use of the Political Dialogue. Oth-
er legislatures being very active ‘users’ of the tool were 
the Italian Senate, the Czech Senate and the German 
Bundesrat. This is in line with the observation that the 
EWS allows upper chambers1 to compensate for their 
somewhat marginal role within the national account-
ability chain. Two counter examples, however, where 
the lower house is more active than the upper house, 
are France or Romania. 
Inter-parliamentary cooperation (IPC) is seen as a 
precondition for the EWS to work, in order to exchange 
opinions and arguments across national boundaries. 
The main channels for inter-parliamentary cooperation 
are seen to be COSAC, the network of administrative 
liaisons in Brussels, and IPEX. COSAC is seen as the 
key formal venue for inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
COSAC meetings take place twice a year, and are or-
ganized and chaired by the parliament of the country 
holding the rotating Presidency. As such COSAC has 
a role in ‘show-casing’ the importance of the rotating 
Presidency of the EU as COSAC meetings usually take 
place in the capital of the Member State holding the 
Chair. COSAC can take on a key role in organising sup-
port for yellow cards. 
Note that cooperation across parliaments not only takes 
place at the level of directly elected members of par-
liament (MPs) but also at the level of parliamentary 
officials. The most established form of cooperation is 
that of parliamentary liaisons in Brussels, a majority of 
national parliaments delegate officials that for are for 
the most part based in the premises of the EP. Liaisons 
have been ascribed a ‘bridge-building function’ across 
national parliaments and are seen as a hub for informa-
tion exchange. Moreover IPEX is noteworthy insofar 
as this is a platform for information exchange between 
national parliaments and the European Parliament. 
IPEX contains information such as on the progress of 
scrutiny in member states and any reasoned opinions. 
Parliaments make different use of IPEX. Some for ex-
ample also add national documents. The countries that 
upload most documents on IPEX are Austria, Germany, 
1   Please note that the German Bundesrat (German Federal Council) is 
formally not an upper house, but the second chamber of the German 
parliament.
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Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the Czech and French 
Sénat and the Polish Sejm. 
Based on the TEU and the Treaty on Stability, Coordi-
nation and Governance (TSCG) IPC has also flourished 
in institutional terms. Most notable in this context are 
the Inter-Parliamentary Conferences on the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (CSDP), which were established 
in 2012 and within the domain Economic and Financial 
Governance in 2013. The establishment of both confer-
ences was however plagued by inter-institutional rival-
ries. On 9 and 10 October 2017 a Joint Parliamentary 
Scrutiny Group on Europol had its constitutive meeting 
expanding IPC into this domain as well.
Factors that enable parliaments to play an 
active role in EU affairs (regardless of arena) 
General factors that impact parliamentary ability to 
fulfil their roles in EU affairs effectively include access 
to information, the support through parliamentary staff 
as well as the designation of rapporteurs. 
Effective scrutiny depends to a large degree on the 
amount, but especially on the quality of information 
parliaments receive. Since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments receive all public 
documents directly from the European institutions, 
including the Commission’s green and white papers 
and communications. A large number of parliaments 
now also receive so-called Explanatory Memorandums 
on EU legislative proposals that outline the proposal 
as well as the governments (initial) views on the con-
tent including subsidiarity issues. There are, however, 
differences with regard to the provision of non-public 
documents, such as limité, confidential or secret doc-
uments, Committee of the Permanent Representatives 
of the Governments of the Member States to the Euro-
pean Union (COREPER) and working group papers or 
internal briefings. Best practice examples are the Italian 
Camera dei Deputi, where the Italian Permanent Rep-
resentative has to provide the parliamentary liaison 
with all information pertaining to EU negotiations. The 
German Bundestag also has similarly extensive access 
to documents.
Given that most parliaments have long complained 
about suffering from an information overflow in EU 
affairs, it depends to a large extent on the capacities 
of parliamentary committees to deal with and process 
the information they receive from both the EU and 
their government. Parliaments have also developed 
means to select and prioritise EU documents for scru-
tiny – either continuously or through ex ante selection. 
A long-standing example for the former, is the Euro-
pean Scrutiny Committee (ESC) of the House of Com-
mons. The main task of the ESC is to examine all EU 
documents on an on-going basis and to filter out those, 
which it considers legally and/or politically important. 
Selected documents are referred for public debate to 
an, ad hoc convened, European Union Committee or, 
exceptionally, to the Committee of the Whole House.
Another strategy to in the quest of enhancing parlia-
mentary scrutiny is to attribute the responsibility for 
certain dossiers/issues to MPs. The Polish Sejm uses 
a system of rapporteurs who are assigned to EU legisla-
tive proposals. The Belgian lower house has introduced 
a system of ‘Europromoters’: every sectoral committee 
has appointed such a Europromoter among its mem-
bers, who has the task to follow the EU policy making 
processes that are relevant for the committee. 
The capacity to deal with European issues also depends 
on the number of committees involved in Euro-
pean Affairs as well as their ‘jurisdictions’. In some 
parliaments, the EAC is the main forum for dealing 
with European issues, with some cooperation with- or 
consultation of the specialised standing committees. In 
other parliaments, the specialised standing committees 
are responsible for the scrutiny of European issues in 
their specific policy areas. Best practices combine the 
‘best of both worlds’ by largely delegating to the stand-
ing committees, but involving the EAC as the lead com-
mittee or as the main mediator between committees 
involved. In the Swedish Riksdag, for example, scrutiny 
is decentralised, but the mandating rights rest with the 
EAC. The standing committees participate at an early 
stage in EU policy making which allows for in-depth 
scrutiny and the hearing of government representatives. 
Administrators are seen to play an important role in 
supporting MPs in the conduct of parliamentary scruti-
ny. But just as there is variation of parliamentary scruti-
ny across member states, the number and role of admin-
istrators varies to a great extent. The ratio between how 
many staff members support MPs differs greatly. Here 
the German Bundestag is supported by a parliamentary 
administration that is seen as the most ‘resourceful’ of 
all national parliaments. This is in stark contrast with 
the Spanish parliament, for example.
Where to go from here?
As the comparative study shows, how national parlia-
ments engage in EU affairs is not simply a function of 
their institutional capacities. While there is a rather 
clear relationship between institutional strength and 
the extent to which they try to influence and control the 
government’s EU policies within the domestic arena, 
other activities, by contrast, such as debates or engage-
ment within the European Arenas, e.g. through the EWS 
and the Political Dialogue, do not follow the same pat-
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tern. Overall, parliamentary traditions as well as MPs’ 
incentives and motivations also play an important role. 
Expanding or strengthening parliamentary participa-
tion rights in EU affairs will thus not per se guarantee 
an active involvement in all arenas. Yet two arguments 
can be made for further strengthening parliamentary 
participation rights in EU affairs: First, strong institu-
tional prerogatives may be no guarantee, but they do 
enable parliaments to fulfil their roles. Second, as the 
introduction of the Political Dialogue as well as the 
EWS have demonstrated, providing parliaments with 
new instruments in EU affairs can lead to reforms of 
parliamentary procedures and increase MPs’ motivation 
to become engaged across different arenas. 
The study, however, also underlines that any assess-
ment of parliamentary involvement also depends on 
the prior definition of what their role in the EU should 
consist of. If the domestic policy-influencing function 
(i.e. exerting influence on the government’s negotia-
tion position) is considered most important, the policy 
shapers seem to perform especially well. Yet where an 
assessment takes the communication function of na-
tional parliaments into account, policy shapers often 
perform less well; few chambers score highly on both 
types of activity. Similarly, any assessment of the in-
volvement of parliaments in the Political Dialogue or 
the EWS needs to consider whether such an engage-
ment is normatively desirable. As has been argued in 
the literature, focussing on these new instruments can 
be time consuming, thus binding scarce parliamentary 
resources and distracting parliaments from functions 
that some consider far more important, such as con-
trolling the government and communicating EU poli-
tics to the citizens. Regardless of what arena they use, 
parliamentary involvement ought to overcome what 
Lindseth (2010) has termed the ‘democratic disconnect’ 
and thus provide a link between European politics and 
the citizens. 
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1. Introduction
Over the last years, and especially since the Treaty of 
Lisbon (TEU) came into force, the role of National Par-
liaments (NP) has changed fundamentally, for example 
by formalising the role of national parliaments as the 
‘guardians of the subsidiary principle’ and a new role 
in treaty revisions. This turns national legislatures into 
EU actors in their own right and adds various new are-
nas that they can become active in at the same time. 
In addition to their ‘traditional’ role of scrutinising the 
government in EU affairs, national parliaments can thus 
now act both individually and collectively at the EU 
level as well as, in most cases, independently of their 
national governments. 
Against this background, this study examines how na-
tional parliaments have resorted to the different tools 
at their disposal within the different arenas, within the 
practical political process. The underlying rationale is 
to draw lessons from these national parliamentary ex-
periences and as such extrapolate best-practices that 
could be shared to promote improvements in the Eu-
ropeanisation of national parliaments.
‘Europeanisation’ is a concept used to analyse a vari-
ety of changes within European Union and member 
states’ policies, politics and polities resulting from the 
process of European integration. While there exists no 
agreed-upon clear definition, the term is most often 
used to characterise ‘domestic change and adaptation 
to pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU 
membership’ (Featherstone 2003: 7). Even more gener-
ally, one could define Europeanisation as what happens 
‘when something in national political systems is affect-
ed by something European’ (Vink 2003: 63). As these 
definitions imply, there are two sides to the process of 
Europeanisation: Passive Europeanisation describes the 
pressures, but also the opportunities, emanating from 
European integration or, in other words, the impact of 
European integration on national policies, institutions 
or actors; active Europeanisation, in contrast, refers to 
the domestic reaction to these changes (Auel 2015). 
For a long time, the debate in both academia and po-
litical practice focused primarily on the passive form 
of Europeanisation, perceiving national parliaments as 
the objects (or, indeed, victims) of the integration pro-
cess. Accordingly, much of the debate centred on the 
question of whether or not European integration leads 
to the ‘de-parliamentarisation’ of politics (O’Brennan 
and Raunio 2007). According to the ‘de-parliamentari-
sation’ thesis, European integration weakened nation-
al parliaments in two ways. On the one hand, it had a 
direct impact on their legislative sovereignty by trans-
ferring legislative competencies to the EU level. On the 
other hand, European integration has also had a more 
indirect effect by altering the power balance between 
national parliaments and their governments. As Weiler 
(1999: 266) summarized, EU integration ‘pervert[s] the 
balance between executive and legislative organs of 
government of the State. […] [N]ational parliamentary 
control, especially in large member states, [is] more an 
illusion than a reality.’ However, over time the ‘victims’ 
of integration learned ‘to fight back’ (Raunio and Hix 
2000) and obtained new opportunities for participation 
in domestic European policy-making. It was a slow and 
uneven process through which they improved their 
institutional position, but they gained increased rights 
to scrutinise European affairs and to control the way 
in which ministers and officials represented national 
interests in Brussels.
This development of active Europeanisation was often 
supported by the European Treaties, although not al-
ways in the intended form. The failed Danish Referen-
dum as well as the German Constitutional Courts’ de-
cision on the Maastricht Treaty, for example, and the 
resulting intensified debate about the Union’s demo-
cratic deficit were important triggers for national par-
liaments to become more involved in European politics. 
The Maastricht Treaty also mentioned national parlia-
ments for the first time in two declarations annexed to 
the treaty. The europeacooperation contained therein 
were further expanded in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
the “Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the 
European Union”. Yet so far, the Treaty of Lisbon, often 
celebrated as the “Treaty of Parliaments”, had the most 
important impact by establishing the most extensive 
participation rights for national parliaments – and thus 
the most far reaching opportunities in terms of passive 
Europeanisation - so far. As briefly mentioned above, 
these new rights turned national parliaments into Eu-
ropean actors, who can become directly involved in the 
European legislative process, formally independent of 
their respective national governments. In addition, the 
new rights open up many new arenas in which they can 
be active in simultaneously. Auel and Neuhold (2017) 
therefore speak of a new role as “multi-arena players” 
for national parliaments.
In the following, we therefore start by outlining the 
formal involvement of NP in the EU policy-making 
process post-Lisbon (section 2) and discuss their role 
as “multi-arena players”. Thereafter, we contrast the 
formal structures with empirical practice and thus the 
active Europeanisation of national parliaments; first 
we discuss the arena of traditional scrutiny within the 
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member state arena (section 3) and then shed light on 
experiences of implementing the so-called ‘Lisbon pro-
visions’ on national parliaments within the EU arena 
(section 4). Section 5 discusses crosscutting issues that 
affect parliamentary scrutiny in all arenas related to 
the parliamentary infrastructure. Each of these sec-
tions provides a general overview and then zooms in 
on specific examples. The aim is not to provide detailed 
overviews over the handling of EU affairs in each par-
liament, but rather to highlight the pros and cons of 
different arrangements. Section 6 discusses the com-
parative results and concludes.
2. A new role for national parliaments –  
the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty
While earlier Treaties also mentioned the role of NP 
in protocols (Maastricht, Amsterdam), Article 12 of 
the Lisbon Treaty now formally recognises that NP 
‘contribute actively to the good functioning’ of the Un-
ion and defines a number of specific instruments and 
mechanisms in this context:
First, national parliaments are to receive information 
and draft legislative acts from the EU institutions. These 
include all Commission consultation documents such 
as green and white papers upon publication, as well as 
its Legislative and Work Programme or any other in-
strument of legislative planning.2 These are to be sent 
to national parliaments by the Commission. Moreover 
all draft legislative acts that are sent to the European 
Parliament (EP) and to the Council, such as propos-
als from the Commission, initiatives from a group of 
member states, initiatives of the EP, requests from the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), recommendations 
from the European Central Bank (ECB) are to be sent 
to national parliaments either by the EP (when it refers 
to an EP initiative) or by the Council (for all the other 
initiatives). Last but not least the agendas and minutes 
of the meetings of the Council, including those where 
deliberations are made on draft legislative acts, shall 
also be forwarded to national parliaments at the same 
time as to member states’ governments. This is a step 
forward for those parliaments that were previously 
dependent on their respective governments to provide 
them with information on EU affairs but of course does 
not encompass any pre-selection as regards to which 
acts are to be submitted to parliamentary scrutiny.
Article 12 TEU, second, strengthens the formal role of 
NP regarding Treaty revisions. While NP always had 
to ratify Treaty changes - unless they were subject to 
referendums - this ‘veto player role’ has been extended 
to two further types of Treaty change, the simplified 
Treaty revision procedure as well as the passerelles 
2   Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol on the role of national parliaments. 
introduced in articles 48 TEU and 81 TFEU. While the 
former also have to be ratified within each member 
state, NP have been given a direct veto right regarding 
the two ‘passerelle clauses’3 that can be exercised within 
six months of the notification of the change. An even 
more important step in this context is the fact that he 
Convention method as part of the ordinary Treaty re-
vision procedure (Article 48 TEU) has been formalised. 
Members of NP are now formally members of future 
Conventions and can thus be seen on an equal footing 
with the representatives of national executives and EU 
institutions. While the final decision on Treaty revisions 
is still taken within an Intergovernmental Conference, 
the new procedure supplements the individual veto 
player role by a more active, collective constitutional 
role at the EU level. 
Third, compliance with the principle of subsidiarity is to 
be ensured, a mechanism, which is commonly referred 
to as the EWS (Rothenberger and Vogt 2007). To this 
end it is foreseen in the protocol on the application of 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality that 
all the draft legislative acts sent to national parliaments 
shall contain a detailed statement that makes it possible 
to appraise the compliance with these principles. Ac-
cordingly, any national parliament or any chamber of 
a national parliament may, within eight weeks from the 
date of transmission of a legislative act, in the official 
languages of the Union, send to the Presidents of the 
EP, the Council and the Commission a reasoned opin-
ion stating why it considers that the draft in question 
does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Each 
national parliament has two votes and in the case of 
bicameral systems, each of the two chambers has one 
vote. In this context two procedures commonly referred 
to as “yellow and orange cards procedures” form one of 
the cornerstones of the Treaty when it comes to parlia-
3   The transition from unanimity to qualified majority or transition from 
special to ordinary legislative procedure, and to this end it is foreseen 
that national parliaments shall be informed at least six months before any 
decision is adopted.
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mentary control. The so-called ‘yellow’ card procedure 
consists of the following: where reasoned opinions on a 
non-compliance of a draft legislative act with the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity represent at least one third of all 
the votes allocated to national parliaments, the draft 
must be reviewed. After such review, the institution that 
has put forward the proposal may decide to maintain, 
amend or withdraw the draft. In this context, reasons 
must be given for the decision. The ‘orange’ card proce-
dure states that under the ordinary legislative procedure 
(OLP), if the reasoned opinions regarding subsidiarity 
represent at least a simple majority of the votes allocat-
ed to national parliament, the draft legislative act must 
be reviewed. After this review, the Commission may 
decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the proposal. If 
the option is to maintain the proposal, the Commission 
shall issue a reasoned opinion justifying why it con-
siders that the proposal complies with the principle of 
subsidiarity. This reasoned opinion, together with the 
reasoned opinions from national parliaments, shall be 
submitted to the Union legislator (Council and EP), for 
consideration in the procedure. If by a majority of 55% 
of the members of the Council or a simple majority of 
the votes cast in the EP, the legislator is of the opinion 
that the proposal does not comply with the principle 
of subsidiarity, no further consideration shall be given 
to it. One could envisage that this might lead to more 
cooperation between national parliaments and the EU 
institutions, notably the EP.
Note that the EWS foresees that an eight week period 
shall elapse between the moment when a draft legisla-
tive proposal is made available to national parliaments 
in all official languages of the Union and the date when 
it is placed on a provisional agenda for the Council for 
its adoption of a position under a legislative procedure. 
This puts a halt to the legislative process insofar as no 
formal position on a proposal can be adopted by the 
EU institutions within this period.
Fourth, national parliaments are to take part in the eval-
uation mechanisms for the implementation of the Union 
policies in the area of freedom, security and justice and 
to be involved in the political monitoring of Europol and 
in the evaluation of activities of Eurojust. Moreover, 
national parliaments are to be involved in the revision 
procedures of the Treaties and receive notifications 
of applications for accession to the European Union. 
Fifth, NP can bring an action before the Court of Jus-
tice of the EU (CJEU) on the grounds of a breach of the 
subsidiarity principle4 (Protocol no. 2 to the TEU and 
the TFEU, see Kiiver 2012).
Finally, article 12 TEU also formally recognises and 
supports the engagement of NP in inter-parliamentary 
cooperation (IPC) (e.g. Art. 12(f) TEU). 
It is noteworthy that the Treaty of Lisbon also clarifies 
the role of the COSAC. It stresses explicitly that the 
Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union 
Affairs (COSAC) has a supporting role vis-à-vis nation-
al parliaments as “contributions from the Conference 
shall not bind national Parliaments and shall not pre-
judge their positions.”5 According to the Lisbon Treaty, 
COSAC may also organise Inter-Parliamentary Confer-
ences on specific topics, in particular within the field 
of CFSP. 
Apart from the formal Treaty provisions, the so-called 
‘Barroso initiative’ has gained ground over the last 
years. This form of direct cooperation between na-
tional parliaments and the Commission was estab-
lished outside formal Treaty structures and endorsed 
by the European Council in June 2006.6 Accordingly, 
the Commission is to transmit all new proposals and 
consultation papers to national parliaments directly and 
invite them to react so as to improve the process of pol-
icy formulation (Commission 2006). This mechanism, 
which is not limited to aspects of subsidiarity (Jančić 
2012) aims at establishing a dialogue between national 
parliaments and the European Commission early in the 
policy-making process. This can be seen as symbolic of 
a recognition that national parliaments can participate 
directly in EU policy making without being mediated 
by their national government (Rozenberg 2017).
Overall, this leads us to the observation that the pro-
visions of the Lisbon Treaty ‘challenge the notion of 
representation provided by parliaments at different 
levels and within clearly demarcated areas of authority’ 
(Auel and Neuhold 2017: 1549). National parliaments 
can now be seen as formally, albeit not necessarily de 
facto, independent players within the EU policy-making 
process. Within the constitutional process (Convention) 
and the EWS they can be seen to take on a collective 
role within the European arena. 
4   Please note that NP cannot bring action before the CJEU directly as they 
lack the necessary legal standing. Thus, they still have to rely on their gov-
ernments in this case. Yet in most, albeit not all (e.g. Spain), member states 
constitutional or statutory rules oblige the government to comply with a 
parliamentary decision to bring action – in some cases even with qualified 
minority decisions as e.g. in France or Germany (see Hefftler et al. 2015). 
5   The Protocol on the “Role of National Parliaments in the European Union” 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam for the first time recognized COSAC. It came 
into force 1 May 1999.
6   This initiative was announced officially in the Commission’s Communica-
tion to the European Council ‘A Citizens’ Agenda - Delivering Results for 
Europe’ of 10 May 2006 (COM(2006) 211 final).
‘Europeanisation’ of  National Parliaments in European Union Member States: Experiences and Best Practices 13
We accordingly conceive national parliaments as 
multi-arena players (Auel and Neuhold 2017). The chang-
es introduced mainly by the Lisbon Treaty discussed 
above, can be seen as characterised by three main de-
velopments. In addition to their traditional role of scruti-
nising their governments in EU affairs, parliaments now 
can assume a collective role in EU politics. Second, they 
are, both individually and collectively, directly involved 
in the legislative process at the European level, thus turning 
into EU rather than only national institutions. Third, 
they are, in many, albeit not all, aspects of this new 
European role, formally independent of their governments.
As a result, NP can now be simultaneously active in 
various different arenas: 
 3 as individual players within their member state/
domestic arena (traditional scrutiny), 
 3 as individual players within the EU arena (for ex-
ample Political Dialogue, CJEU action where pos-
sible, treaty revisions) and 
 3 as collective parliamentary players together with 
other NP (EWS, formal IPC, Convention). 
Figure 1 illustrates this role of national parliaments as multi-arena players:
NP
NP
NPNP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
NP
EP
COM
COUNCIL
EWS IPC
Convention
Passerelle Veto
Domestic scrutiny
Political Dialogue
NATIONAL 
GOV’T
Figure 1: National parliaments as multi-arena players. Source: Auel and Neuhold (2017: 1551)
 
In the following, we will discuss how parliaments use 
these provisions, first within the domestic arena (section 
3) and then within the European arenas (section 4). We 
then focus on ‘cross-cutting issues’ by examining cer-
tain factors that can contribute to national parliaments 
exercising their role within the different arenas more 
effectively (section 5). Each of these sections starts off 
by way of outlining some general trends/observations 
across member states, to then be able to focus on spe-
cific examples in more detail. Section 6 draws conclu-
sions from a comparative perspective.
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3. ‘Traditional parliamentary scrutiny’ of EU affairs 
within the national arena
3.1 General trends and observations
First of all, it is important to note that the so-called 
Lisbon provisions sketched above do not replace par-
liamentary scrutiny of EU affairs at the national level 
but merely supplement them. Indeed, when asked by 
COSAC to rank the relative importance to them of the 
institutions they scrutinised, an overwhelming majority 
(93 per cent) of the Chambers/parliaments selected the 
scrutiny of their own national government as the most 
important, followed by European Commission, the Eu-
ropean Council and the Council of the European Union 
on ranks two to four (COSAC 2013a: 15). 
Regarding the institutional arrangements for parliamen-
tary involvement in EU affairs, we can detect a process 
of harmonization over time; scrutiny provisions are now 
more similar, but far from uniform, across the EU mem-
ber states.7 All national parliaments have set up one or 
more European Affairs Committees (EAC), but great 
differences still remain regarding the involvement of 
other standing committees in EU affairs. Similarly, we 
can find variation with regard to the scrutiny approach. 
Although the addressee of the scrutiny procedure is, in 
the end, always the government, systems differ with re-
gard to whether parliament scrutinises EU documents 
or the government position for the negotiations in the 
Council or both. While some parliaments issue written 
statements, others transmit their position on European 
issues to the government orally during committee ses-
sions, and some use both procedures. Most importantly, 
the consequences of such statements differ greatly. In 
some cases, the government is under a legal obligation 
or strong political pressure to follow the position of their 
parliaments in the EU negotiations (mandating proce-
dure). In many other cases, however, parliaments can 
only give their opinion without this having a binding ef-
fect on the government. Furthermore, a number of par-
liaments have established so called ‘scrutiny reserves’ 
aimed at preventing government representatives from 
agreeing to a proposal in the Council while the parlia-
mentary scrutiny process is on-going (Auel et al. 2012). 
A number of studies have classified and ranked nation-
al parliaments according to their institutional strength 
in EU affairs. Although the rankings differ slightly due 
to a different emphasis on specific institutional pro-
7   A comprehensive overview over the scrutiny provisions in all national 
parliaments can be found in Hefftler et al. 2015. 
visions, the overall picture is fairly consistent: As the 
latest rankings by Karlas (2012), Winzen (2012) as well 
as Auel et al. (2015a) show, we can identify a group of 
strong, mainly North European, parliaments including 
those of Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, but also Ger-
many, the Netherlands and Austria. In contrast, rather 
weak parliaments can be found in Southern member 
states Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain, but 
also in Belgium and Luxembourg. France, Italy and 
the UK fall somewhere in between. Finally, the new 
constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe tend to 
accord a greater role for legislatures, and in contrast 
to their Western European counterparts, many of their 
parliaments can – at least with regard to their formal 
institutional position – be considered as rather strong.
Unfortunately, comparative studies on how national 
parliaments make use of their institutional provisions 
are still rare. The so far only study providing compar-
ative empirical data on parliamentary activities across 
all, then8, 40 Chambers was conducted in the context of 
the Observatory of Parliaments after Lisbon (OPAL) 
research project (Auel et al. 2015a) and included parlia-
mentary statements (resolutions and mandates), plena-
ry debates on EU issues, EAC meetings, hearings with 
the prime minister and opinions issued in the context 
of the EWS and the Political Dialogue (see below) be-
tween 2010 and 2012. As the study shows, the powerful 
parliaments of Denmark, Finland, Germany and Swe-
den are also the most active, followed by the Austrian, 
Dutch, Estonian, Italian and Lithuanian parliaments. 
The Portuguese parliament is also in this group of active 
institutions, although the Assembleia focuses primarily 
on sending opinions within the Political Dialogue (see 
below). Among the least active are the parliaments of 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Cyprus, Hungary 
and Malta. The parliaments of Belgium, France, Ire-
land, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain and the UK form a large intermediate 
group. These findings indicate that despite their initially 
weaker position vis-à-vis their executives during and 
after the accession process, a number of the new CEE 
parliaments have now become very active in EU affairs. 
As figure 2 suggests, institutional strength in EU affairs 
is a rather good predictor of the actual parliamentary 
activity.
8   During the time period covered (2010 to 2012), Croatia had not yet joined 
the EU. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between Institutional Strength andAactivity in EU Affairs (scores)
Source: Auel et al. 2015: 80. AV indicates the average scores for institutional strength and activity across all 40 chambers,  
Croatia is omitted as it was not a member state at the time. L denotes lower and U Upper chambers; for country abbreviations see Appendix.
3.2 Parliamentary involvement within  
the domestic arena: zooming in
In this section, we zoom in on the specific ways nation-
al parliaments are involved in EU affairs within the do-
mestic arena. Here, scholars have identified five ideal 
modes of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, four of 
which relate to the domestic arena of scrutiny, namely the 
modes of expert; government watchdog; public forum; 
policy-shaper (Hefftler and Rozenberg 2015) (see table 
1). The fifth mode of involvement, that of European play-
er, can have individual and collective dimension (Auel 
and Neuhold 2017) and will be discussed further below. 
The first mode, that of ‘Expert’ relates to the develop-
ment of in-depth expertise on EU matters, often expressed 
through the publication of in-depth reports on EU issues. 
The mode of ‘Policy Shaper’, in turn, emphasises par-
liamentary influence on the government’s negotiation 
position through mandates or resolutions ahead of Coun-
cil and European Council meetings. 
The ‘Government Watchdog’ mode, on the other hand, 
focuses on the function of holding governments to ac-
count. Controlling what the government “does in Brus-
sels” is thus seen as the main task and normally takes 
place ex post. 
The type of ‘Public Forum’, finally, refers to the par-
liamentary communication function. Here emphasis 
is mainly on plenary debates as well as other means of 
disseminating information. 
Table 1: General Modes and Instruments of Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Affairs
Domestic Arena
Mode of involvement Instruments Parliamentary body/bodies
Expert (Comprehensive) reports ex ante EAC and other committees
Policy shaper Mandates and resolutions ex ante EAC and other committees
Government watchdog Questions, hearings, debates ex post
Plenary or  
committees
Public forum
Plenary debates and other forms of communication 
both ex ante and ex post
Plenary (websites)
EU Arenas
Mode of involvement Instruments Parliamentary body/bodies
European player: Individual 
Political Dialogue, CJEU action (where possible), 
Treaty changes
EAC and other committees
European player: Collective EWS, formal IPC, Convention EAC and other committees
Source: adapted from Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015
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Please note that parliaments are not limited to one spe-
cific mode of involvement in EU affairs, but can indeed 
combine different modes. In fact, in an ideal world, they 
would combine all of them, i.e. become experts on var-
ious EU issues, who produce in-depth reports, but also 
use this expertise to influence (policy shaper) and con-
trol/hold accountable (watchdogs) their governments 
effectively both ex ante and ex post while at the same 
also actively communicating EU issues to their citizens 
(public forum). Indeed, when asked in a recent COSAC 
survey (2016a) about the relative importance of different 
activities relating to parliamentary involvement in EU 
affairs, most parliaments attached higher importance 
to all three activities, with being a policy shaper (27 
out of 38) and serving as a public forum (27 out of 38) 
trailing only slightly behind government oversight (34 
respondents of 38) (table 2). 
 
Table 2: Importance attached to Activities relating to Parliamentary Involvement in EU Affairs
Government oversight Policy shaper Public forum
Austrian Nationalrat and Bundesrat 1 1 1
Belgian Chambre des représentants 2 2 2
Belgian Sénat 2 2 2
Bulgarian Narodno sabranie 2 1 1
Croatian Hrvatski sabor 2 2 2
Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon 2 2 2
Czech Poslanecká sněmovna 2 1 1
Czech Senát 2 2 2
Danish Folketing 2 1 2
Dutch Tweede Kamer 2 2 2
Dutch Eerste Kamer 2 2 2
Estonian Riigikogu 2 2 2
Finnish Eduskunta 2 2 1
French Assemblée nationale 2 2 2
French Sénat 2 2 2
German Bundestag 2 2 2
German Bundesrat 2 2 1
Greek Vouli ton Ellinon 2 2 2
Hungarian Országgyűlés 2 1 1
Irish Houses of the Oireachtas 2 2 2
Italian Camera dei Deputati 2 2 2
Italian Senato della Repubblica 2 2 2
Latvian Saeima 2 2 2
Lithuanian Seimas 2 2 2
Luxembourg Chambre des Députés 1 2 2
Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati 2 1 1
Polish Sejm 2 1 1
Polish Senat 1 2 1
Portuguese Assembleia da República 2 1 2
Romanian Camera Deputaţilor 2 2 2
Romanian Senatul 2 1 2
Slovak Národná rada 2 2 1
Slovenian Državni zbor 2 1 1
Slovenian Državni svet 2 2 2
Spanish Cortes Generales 1 2 2
Swedish Riksdag 2 2 2
UK House of Commons 2 1 1
UK House of Lords 2 2 2
Source: based on data from COSAC (2016a, annex), 0 = Not important, 1 = Moderately important, 2 = Important. 
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In the ‘real world’, however, parliaments generally suf-
fer from limited resources, most importantly with re-
gard to time and manpower. Busy institutions to begin 
with, European affairs have added considerably to their 
workload. In addition, and as outlined above, they have 
different institutional prerogatives and capacities to 
deal with EU affairs that impact the type of involvement 
they focus on. There are therefore very few parliaments 
that are able to focus on all five modes of involvement.
3.3 ‘Telling the government what to do –  
and making sure they comply…’:  
parliamentary influence and oversight
Regarding institutional prerogatives and capacities, 
strong rights of influences are a precondition for the 
mode of policy shaper. Here, the differences between 
the parliaments vary markedly. In only eight member 
states must the government obtain a mandate from 
parliament before being able to take a position in the 
Council, namely in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and 
Sweden (COSAC 2017a). In other member states, par-
liaments can decide to issue mandates and must be 
given adequate time to do so (often ensured through 
a scrutiny reserve). With the notable exception of the 
Austrian Nationalrat, the German Bundesrat (in are-
as falling into the jurisdiction of the Länder) and the 
Estonian Riigikogu, mandates are usually not legally 
binding. Even non-binding mandates can, however, 
have strong politically binding effect, especially if the 
government is obliged to report and justify any devia-
tions from the parliamentary opinion. This is the case 
in the parliaments of Finland, Germany, Hungary, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Sweden (Karlas 2012). Yet irrespective of how binding 
mandates are politically, their actual impact depends 
very much on whether governments are actually sys-
tematically held accountable for deviations from the 
parliamentary position ex post. This relates to the mode 
of ‘Government Watchdog’ and the extent to which 
parliaments control ‘what their government has been 
up to in Brussels’. Yet most parliaments do not follow 
up regularly on the Council meetings (COSAC 2017a): 
only 15 parliaments/chambers stated that the govern-
ment reports back to parliament on the position taken 
in the Council (Belgian Sénat, Croatian Hrvatski sabor, 
Danish Folketing, French Sénat, German Bundestag, 
Hungarian Országgyűlés, Lithuanian Seimas, Luxem-
bourg Chambre des Députés, Romanian Senat, Slove-
nian National Assembly, Spanish Cortes Generales, 
Swedish Riksdag, UK House of Commons). An issue 
related to both ex ante and ex post control is, final-
ly, also the meeting frequency of the EACs. In a large 
number of parliaments the EACs meet every week or 
even more frequently - at least while the parliament 
is in session. Others meet less frequently, either once 
a fortnight (Polish Senate) or month (both Houses of 
the Austrian Parliament, Czech Poslanecká snűmovna, 
Maltese Kamratad-Deputati), or they schedule meetings 
according to work load (COSAC 2017a). 
Zooming in on individual parliaments, the Danish 
Folketing is usually considered as the prime example 
of a very strong mandating legislature, as the govern-
ment needs to seek parliamentary approval for its po-
sition before negotiating in Brussels. This mandate is 
usually given before the final Council meeting, and thus 
rather late in the legislative process. Yet the power of 
the EAC emanates not so much from the mandating 
procedure as such, as the government proposals for 
mandates rarely contested (Christensen 2015: 281), but 
rather from the fact that Denmark usually has minority 
governments. As a result, the Danish mandating sys-
tem is not easily transferred to countries with majority 
governments, as the loyalty between the government 
and its supporting majority can hamper tight scrutiny 
and legislative leverage will not be as strong (see, for 
example, the case of Sweden below). In Denmark, how-
ever, the government cannot rely on the loyalty of the 
parliamentary majority to implement EU legislation or 
decisions at a later stage. The government therefore 
needs to ensure that EU decisions will not be met with 
resistance during the transposition stage. As a result, 
the government has every incentive to keep the EAC 
fully informed of the issue under consideration as well 
as the negotiation situation in Brussels and to ensure 
parliamentary approval for its own position (Auel and 
Benz 2005). In addition, the government is obliged to 
report back on the results of Council meetings, yet as 
parliamentary influence is the main aim, the commit-
tee mainly focuses on ex ante scrutiny (Christensen 
2013a: 42). One of the downsides of the Danish system 
is the focus on mandates given just before the relevant 
Council meeting, at which point the decision-making 
process has progressed rather far and real influence 
may be more limited (see also Christensen 2015: 282). 
In Finland, mandates given by the Grand Committee 
are also considered politically binding. Involvement of 
the parliaments begins relatively early, and the Grand 
Committee will try to formulate a first view on legis-
lative proposals, based on opinions from the stand-
ing committees, before they are being considered in 
the Council working groups (on this and the following, 
Raunio 2015: 413 and Raunio 2016). This early involve-
ment also enables the Grand Committee not only to 
keep track of the views of other member states or the 
European Institutions and to develop its own position 
accordingly, but also to organise hearings with civil 
servants involved in the preparatory work both at the 
domestic and the EU level and, finally to identify possi-
ble conflicts between the parliament and the executive 
early in the process (Raunio 2015: 418). Instructions are 
given throughout the process with the final mandates 
‘Europeanisation’ of  National Parliaments in European Union Member States: Experiences and Best Practices 18
being issued for the relevant Council meetings, usual-
ly following a confidential discussion with the relevant 
minister of the relevant issues and their implications for 
all Council agenda items. Ex post control is ensured by 
the obligation of the Government to send a report on 
each Council meeting outlining the results. In addition, 
ministers must be prepared to appear before the Grand 
Committee to explain any deviation from the mandates 
in detail. As in Denmark, the system is (or at least was, 
see further below) geared towards creating a consen-
sually agreed upon Finnish position. 
In Sweden, the mandating system is tied to a ‘minority 
government logic’9 similar to Denmark, while at the 
same time being closer to the Finnish model of more 
continuous scrutiny. While final mandates are given by 
the EAC each Friday for the upcoming Council meeting 
on the basis of all Council agenda items, both EAC, but 
especially the standing committees deal with different 
Council agenda items earlier and more often, with sev-
eral hundred individual parliamentary views on Council 
items issued per year (data based on Auel et al. 2015a). 
According to the Riksdag Act of 2007, the parliament 
must also scrutinise all EU green and white papers (He-
geland 2015: 429). As a result, the Riksdag not only 
has strong scrutiny rights, but it is also the most active 
when it comes to taking on a policy shaper role (see 
also figure 3 below). In addition, any deviation from the 
mandate may result in further parliamentary scrutiny, 
for example by the Swedish Committee on the Con-
stitution (Hegeland 2015: 428). Concerning important 
decisions, members of parliament (MPs) are therefore 
also informed during Council negotiations if a man-
date has to be changed, for example via text message 
or telephone conference (Mastenbroek et al. 2014: 99). 
The mandating system in the Estonian Riigikogu is 
rather similar to that of Denmark, Finland or Sweden, 
with regular mandates given orally in an EAC meet-
ings before the Council meetings and on the basis of 
regular input by the standing committees. Yet the - le-
gally binding - mandating system is, according to Ehin 
(2015: 520), undermined by the lack of any systematic 
follow-up to Council meetings. The government pro-
vides the EAC with written information on the meeting, 
and there are occasional ex post deliberations in the 
committee, but even the latter seem to be limited to 
‘acknowledging the information provided’ (minutes of 
the EAC cited from Ehin 2015: 520). As a result of the 
‘lax control … the government appears to enjoy greater 
room for manoeuvre than the letter of the law provides’ 
(Ehin 2015: 521). Ikstens (2015) and Vilpisaukas (2015) 
report a similar situation in Latvia and Lithuania, re-
spectively, with very strong parliamentary powers, but 
little engagement and especially, little ex post control. 
9   This could be seen during the majority government 2006 to 2010, when the 
strong solidarity between the government and its supporting party groups 
led to less tight scrutiny (Hegeland 2015: 426).
In the Netherlands, the Tweede Kamer has several op-
tions: It can place a parliamentary reserve on a doc-
ument, which forces the government to hold a debate 
on an issue and to agree with parliament on a position 
before it can negotiate at the EU level. Parliament as 
well as the committees can also adopt resolutions or 
positions that are not legally, but considered politically 
binding: the ‘mandate’ is set out in a letter by the com-
mittee and the relevant ministry and the government 
usually reports back after Council meetings to explain 
the outcome in relation to the parliamentary position 
(Högenauer 2015: 257, but see also below). 
As the OPAL data indicates, the right to issue mandates 
is clearly closely related to adopting a policy shaper 
mode. Figure 3 below illustrates that there is a rather 
strong, and highly statistically significant, positive cor-
relation between institutional strength and resolutions/
mandates issued, r(40) = 0,674, p< 0.001. 
At the same time, however, the effect of mandates 
should also not be overestimated. On the one hand, 
even very strong parliaments usually try not to bind 
their government to mandates that are too narrow or 
have no chance of support at the EU level. They rather 
lay down parliamentary red lines or define a range of 
outcomes that are acceptable to parliament (for Finland, 
Raunio 2015: 413, for Denmark, Christensen 2015, for 
the Netherlands, Eben et al. 2013). On the other hand, 
MPs from strong mandating parliaments also complain 
that governments can and do circumvent mandates by 
simply abstaining from a vote in the Council if the vote 
reflects their preferences but would require a deviation 
from the parliamentary mandate. And finally, they can 
‘wriggle’ out of their responsibility by a strategic (re-) 
interpretation of the mandates: 
“For example, on March 17, 2011 the [Durch Tweede 
Kamer] adopted a resolution […] that requested the 
Cabinet to ‘firmly distance itself from any movement to-
wards a more political union’ [...]. In subsequent debates 
the Cabinet had to come back to this resolution, and it 
had to reassure the Chamber that the resolution was not 
transgressed by the measures decided upon in Brussels. 
The Cabinet did so in a way that preserved the spirit 
of the resolution, but not the literal meaning, because 
otherwise it could not have progressed on issues such 
as the fiscal pact. In explaining how the resolution had 
been respected, the Cabinet stated that member states 
would assess each other, but not prescribe measures to 
one another. In this way the Cabinet was able to cre-
ate room for manoeuvre without having to admit that 
it would breach the resolution’ (Eben et al. 2013b: 65).
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Figure 3: Relationship between Institutional Strength and Mandates/Resolutions issued (scores)
Source: Auel et al. 2015a: 84; AV indicates the average scores for institutional strength and activity across all 40 chambers,  
Croatia is omitted as it was not a member state at the time. L denotes lower and U Upper chambers; for country abbreviations see Appendix.  
In addition, some of the parliaments that lack strong 
mandating rights have found other, albeit more indi-
rect and subtle ways of trying to exert influence. Here, 
the mode of ‘Expert’ comes in, and prime examples 
are the two Houses of the French Parliament or the 
House of Lords. 
The main committee dealing with EU affairs in the As-
semblée Nationale is the Commission des affaires eu-
ropéennes, which shares the right to table motions for 
resolutions with other standing committees as well as 
individual MPs. Resolutions, which have to be issued 
by the plenary, are, however, explicitly non-binding 
and considered as having less of a politically binding 
effect as well. Consequently, Parliament tries to influ-
ence the government more indirectly through extensive 
rapports d’information (Auel and Benz 2005). Contrary 
to the reports of many other national European Affairs 
Committees, these rapports frequently have ‘paperback 
dimensions’ and provide in-depths studies of specific 
European issues. By drafting these detailed and – most 
importantly – public reports, the French Parliament not 
only provides information on European affairs for the 
general public. It is also able to argue for its views and 
standpoints and formulate indirect demands without 
directly determining or criticising the government’s 
negotiation position.
In the House of Lords, due to its rather unique compo-
sition, the European Union Select Committee brings 
together senior and expert peers, many of whom have 
a background in the Civil Service, the European Par-
liament or other EU institutions (Huff and Smith 2015: 
314). Together with the six subcommittees, the EAC is 
also one of the largest with around 50 members. Simi-
lar to the House of Commons (see below section 5), the 
Lords EAC serves as a filter committee for the selection 
of documents to be scrutinised by the subcommittees 
according to their portfolio, but also takes on the scru-
tiny of crosscutting issues. What the House of Lords is 
most famous for, however, are the long-term inquiries it 
conducts, typically 2 to 4 per subcommittee each year 
(Huff and Smith 2015: 318). The lengthy and detailed 
reports, based on extensive written and oral evidence 
from practitioners and academics, are generally con-
sidered of very high quality, presenting a detailed and 
expert analysis of specific EU topics. Within academia, 
but we are certain also within political practice, they 
are often used as resources and widely cited. As Huff 
and Smith argue, in this respect the lack of an electoral 
mandate is a great advantage for the House of Lords, 
as it ‘provides a luxury that elected chambers do not 
enjoy, that of time’ (Huff and Smith 2015: 327). 
3.4 European Council meetings
The meetings of the European Councils have arguably 
become even more important in recent years, and a 
number of parliaments have set up formal rules relating 
specifically to these meetings, either in the Constitution 
or the parliamentary rules of procedure (Wessels et al 
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2013). This is the case in Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Re-
public, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden. In 
most cases, the rules mainly describe the government’s 
obligations towards parliament regarding information 
on upcoming or concluded meetings. 
While the Danish, the Finnish and the Swedish parlia-
ments, scrutiny of European Councils does not differ 
markedly from that of regular Council meetings, with 
the exception of the greater involvement of the prime 
minister. All three parliaments are in a strong position, 
with anecdotal evidence suggesting that prime minis-
ters take parliamentary views seriously.10 Other parlia-
ments, in turn, have developed special procedures for 
European Council meetings. 
In the French Assemblée Nationale, public debates are 
now systematically organised before each meeting of 
the European Council. However, as Kreilinger et al. 
(2013b: 57) point out, the plenary debates on European 
Councils, in particular, often suffer from low attendance 
rates by the MPs, which they explain, inter alia, with 
the fact that the President is constitutionally prohibited 
to attend in person to explain and to advocate his/her 
position. ‘From the MPs to the journalists, everybody 
is aware that the one who is ultimately responsible for 
decision making is not the one in charge of presenting 
the official statements in the assembly, after or before 
the Councils’ (Kreilinger et al. 2013a: 23). Similar prob-
lems have been reported with regard to the semi-presi-
dential system of Lithuania and the presidential system 
in Cyprus (Wessels et al. 2013: 50)
In Portugal, the rules on debates related to the Euro-
pean Council were also continuously adapted. While 
European Council meetings were not scrutinised with 
any degree of regularity before 2006, plenary debates 
with a representative of the government after the last 
European Council of each Presidency became obliga-
tory in 2006. In 2012, these were changed to plenary 
debates before the European Council in the presence 
of the prime minister. The aim was to ensure greater 
influence of the Parliament on the negotiations. Ex post 
control is ensured by ex post committee debates. 
In Austria, the Main Committee can set up a so-called 
‘fire brigade’ committee to monitor very important Eu-
ropean Council meetings more closely. The committee, 
which consists of the chair of the EU sub-committee 
and one member from each of the parliamentary par-
ty groups, cannot issue binding mandates, but it can 
present its opinion to the government representative 
in the European Council (Miklin 2015: 393). During the 
10   Hegeland, for example, reports that the Swedish prime minister, despite 
supporting the statement on the January 2012 European Council himself, 
could not give formal support to the statement ‘for parliamentary reasons’ 
(Hegeland 2015: 437).
final negotiation of the Nice Treaty, for example, the fire 
fighter committee sat in permanence for several days.11 
There is, however, no mechanism for systematic ex 
post control. One of the reasons is that the Nationalrat 
has little, albeit recently increasing, use of the binding 
mandates, from which the government may only deviate 
under very narrow circumstances, and where it did, the 
opinions were formulated in close cooperation between 
the governing parties and the government (Miklin 2015: 
395). As a result, stringent ex post follow-up procedures 
have not been developed so far. 
In Croatia, the prime minister has a rather extensive 
obligation to report to parliament on European Councils 
(Butkovic 2015: 166): Before each meeting, the govern-
ment mainly delivers relevant information to the EAC 
in writing, but, upon invitation by the President of Par-
liament, the prime minister will present the Croatian 
position in the plenary. After each European Council, 
the prime minister has to report to parliament within a 
fortnight, followed by a plenary debate on the report. In 
addition, at the beginning of each year, the prime min-
ister provides a summary report over European Coun-
cil decisions and developments of the previous year, 
again followed by a plenary debate. However, Butkovic 
assess the watchdog role of the parliament to be less 
developed: ‘reporting to parliament on the meetings of 
the Council and the European Council essentially takes 
the form of information sharing, which makes the posi-
tion of the government stronger’ (Butkovic 2015: 468) 
Some parliaments, in turn, are hardly involved in the 
scrutiny of European Councils at all. In Bulgaria, the 
national Assembly is not involved in the preparations 
of European Councils, indeed ‘it is often not even in-
formed about the position of the government before the 
meetings (Kanev 2015: 451). There is also no regular ex 
post control, as the parliamentary rules of procedure 
only provide for the possibility, but do not oblige the 
prime minister to report back to the Assembly. Motions 
to schedule such a hearing by the opposition parties 
have been consistently voted down by the governing 
majority (Kanev 2105: 457). As a result, Kanev argues 
(Ibid.), parliamentary scrutiny is often targeted at the 
EU institutions and ‘seen as supplementing governmen-
tal activity by parliamentary means’, which results in 
resolutions mainly supporting the government position 
and a lack of debate on important political EU decisions. 
In Greece, the parliament has no formal authority to 
pass binding resolutions the government must follow in 
either in European Councils or Summits. According to 
Sotiropoulos (2015: 339), MPs can and do ask written 
questions about the government’s position for European 
Council meetings, but ‘essentially, the government has 
a free had’. That said, the outbreak of the European cri-
sis and the ensuing negotiations over EU financial aid 
11  See: http://derstandard.at/416157/Ein-Ergebnis-unter-Schmerzen
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have clearly led to a greater politicisation. Especially 
the successive bailout packages were debated ex post 
in plenary hearings. 
The Parliament of Cyprus, finally, is in the weakest 
position of all. Due to the presidential system, and the 
ensuing explicit separation of powers in the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Cyprus, parliament has no formal 
means of influence or ex post control regarding Euro-
pean Council meetings (Emilianides et al, 2015). Even 
during the most turbulent time of the Eurozone crisis, 
the parliament did not once debate European Council 
or Summit meetings ex ante, either in the plenary or at 
the committee level, but the EAC did debate results ex 
post on a number of occasions (Wessels et al 2013: 38ff.). 
 
Table 3: Plenary and Committee Debates on European Councils and Summits
Ex Ante
Ex post Limited involvement Committee Plenary Both
Limited 
involvement
Bulgaria, Luxembourg,  
Malta, Romania 
Austria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Poland, 
Slovakia
Netherlands
Committee Cyprus 
Belgium Denmark, Finland, 
Lithuania, Slovenia
Croatia, France, Portugal Germany
Plenary Hungary, Spain, UK Sweden Ireland
Both Greece*
Source: Adapted and updated from Wessels et al 2013: 41 using the contributions in Hefftler et al. 2015,  
*during height of Eurozone crisis, generally little involvement.  
As indicated above, parliaments also vary with regard 
to the involvement of the prime minister in ex ante or 
ex post hearings on the European Councils, an impor-
tant question given that it is the head of government 
(or state, where applicable) rather than ministers, who 
will conduct the negotiations. According to the report 
by Wessels et al. (2013: 56f.):
‘The Prime Minister “orally presents the government 
position to the EAC before a European Council meet-
ing” in Denmark, “[t]he commitment of the Taoiseach 
to these [ex ante and ex post] briefings is notable” in 
Ireland, and the Dutch report takes note of the high per-
sonal involvement if the prime minister who is “present 
in all debates preparing the European Council”. The 
German and Italian reports point to particular cases 
where the prime minister’s involvement has played an 
important role: Before the European Affairs Committee 
in March 2011, the German chancellor stayed discreet 
about informal meetings of the Eurogroup that “would 
not fall under the government’s obligation to inform the 
Bundestag. This later led to a judgement of the Federal 
Constitutional Court that sanctioned this view. Inter-
ventions of the Italian prime minister are linked to the 
importance of the summit: “In cases when the European 
Council and Euro summits are deemed to be particu-
larly important, the Prime Minister himself intervenes.”
 
Table 4: Regular Ex Ante and Ex Post Involvement of the PM
Ex ante + Ex ante -
Ex post +
Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland, UK,  
Denmark, Slovenia, Sweden
Malta, Hungary, Spain
Ex post - Slovakia, Germany, Austria12 the remaining 14 member states
 
Source: Wessels et al. 2013: 45
12   Even if there is no formal statement, in Austria the head of government usually participates in meetings of the European Affairs Committee. 
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3.5 The mode of public forum: 
communicating EU affairs
Indeed, it has now been argued for some time the con-
tribution of national parliaments to the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU cannot be measured solely by 
parliamentary influence and control. Accordingly, 
the importance of parliamentary communication and 
publicity in EU affairs, i.e. the mode of public forum 
is emphasized (eg Auel 2007, Auel and Raunio 2014, 
Rozenberg and Hefftler 2015). 
This is also not a purely academic issue. National parlia-
ments have also been more concerned with their com-
munication role in EU affairs, as the COSAC meeting 
in Bratislava (2016) and Tallinn (2017) show (see also 
the corresponding COSAC reports 2016b and 2017b), 
and studies indicate that they have made, in some cases 
remarkably strong, efforts to communicate EU policies 
(Rauh, 2015, Rauh and De Wilde 2017, Senninger, 2017, 
Wendler, 2016, Wonka, 2016). Above all, the euro debt 
crisis has sharpened parliamentary awareness of pub-
lic relations, as evidenced by a significant increase in 
plenary debates (Auel and Höing 2015). Finally, a recent 
report by the EP’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs 
suggested, inter alia, the introduction of a ‘European 
Week’ taking place simultaneously in all national par-
liaments, during which members of MPs could debate 
European affairs with Commissioners and Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs) (European Parliament 
2018: 5). A resolution to that effect was endorsed by the 
EP on 18 April 2018. 
3.5.1 Plenary debates
Unfortunately, there are few studies that provide em-
pirical data for all parliaments on the number of ple-
nary EU activities such as debates or oral questions 
in EU affairs. Data from the OPAL study shows again 
that parliaments differ markedly in how they engage in 
plenary debates (figure 4): 
 
Figure 4: Number of Debates annual average 2010 to 2012
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Source: Based on data from the OPAL project, Auel et al. 2015a. 
The most active public forums were clearly the Czech 
Senate, the German Bundestag and the Irish Dail. The 
sheer number of debates, however, obscures the differ-
ences between chambers in terms of debate organisa-
tion and parliamentary traditions, especially whether 
they are more ‘debating’ or ‘working legislatures’. The 
number of hours spent on overall plenary debates per 
year ranges from around three hundred hours in the 
Austrian Nationalrat to over one thousand hours in the 
Dutch Tweede Kamer or the UK House of Commons. 
The picture therefore rather changes once we look at 
the share of plenary time dedicated to EU issues (fig-
ure 5). The Czech Senate is still clearly in the lead, now 
followed by the Finnish Eduskunta, the two Houses of 
the Austrian Parliament and the German Bundestag. 
The Irish Dail or the Swedish Parliament, in turn, now 
range below the average.
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Figure 5: Per Cent of Plenary Time (annual averages 2010 to 2012)
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Source: based on data from the OPAL project, Auel et al. 2015a. 
The data is, of course, somewhat outdated, but so far 
an update only exists for seven selected member states 
during the period 2010 to 2013 by Auel et al. (2016), 
which confirms the results (figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Share of Debating Time dedicated to EU Issues 2010 – 2013 (in per cent)
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Source: based on data form the PACE Project, see Auel et al. 2016; https://www.ihs.ac.at/pace/index.html. 
Interestingly, this variation cannot simply be explained 
with the degree of delegation of EU matters to commit-
tees. Among the active debaters in figure X above, reso-
lutions on EU issues have to be voted on in the plenary 
only in Germany, while this responsibility is delegated to 
the EAC in Austria and Finland. Among the less active 
debaters, both in the Polish Sejm and the UK House of 
Commons, a plenary vote is necessary for parliamen-
tary resolutions, but in the latter such votes usually 
take place without a debate. The same holds true for 
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the ability of parliament to decide its own agenda – or 
at least to bring EU issues on the agenda of the plena-
ry. In the Bundestag, the parliamentary party groups 
decide the plenary agenda in the Council of Elders, and 
all groups (but no individual MPs) have the opportuni-
ty to put their issues on the agenda. In the Assemblée 
Nationale, by contrast, the fact that the motion for a 
resolution can be placed on the plenary agenda upon 
the request of a parliamentary party group chairman, a 
committee chairman, or the Government has, in turn, 
not led to greater debating activity. Of the 97 adopted 
resolutions during the XIV parliament (2012 – 2017), 
only 11 were debated in the plenary13. Yet a number of 
other measures have been implemented to strengthen 
the involvement of the plenary in EU affairs. According 
to Article 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assemblée 
Nationale, one week out of four is now dedicated to the 
control of government action and the evaluation of pub-
lic policies. During that period, one session prioritises 
EU related questions, which led to 11 EU debates in the 
XIV parliament (2012-2017). One parliament where the 
rules do seem to matter is the House of Commons. Here, 
the European Scrutiny committee consistently refers 
more items to a debate by the Whole House than the 
government accepts.
In Finland, plenary debates had been rather rare before 
the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, which Raunio (2016) 
explains both with the consensual nature of EU affairs 
as well as the fact that the plenary was not actually 
able to take decision outside of treaty changes. This 
changed, when the impact of the Eurozone crisis not 
only led to a stronger politicisation of EU politics in the 
Eduskunta, but also saw the Eurosceptic and populist 
party The Finns shoot from a relative small parliamen-
tary party group to over 19 per cent in the election in 
April. Both led to ‘a new era of more contested parlia-
mentary engagement in EU affairs. There were more 
plenary debates and even EU-related interpellations, 
and considerably more voting instead of unanimous 
committee decisions’ (Raunio 2016: 243). 
Finally, we would like to draw attention to the inclu-
sion of MEPs in plenary debates. While MEPs can often 
attend, and even speak albeit not vote, in EAC meet-
ings (for an overview see Valentin 2016: 1), speaking 
rights in plenary debates are much rarer. In only 9 out 
of the 41 parliamentary chambers do MEPs have the 
right to participate fully in plenary debates, namely in 
both Houses of the Austrian Parliament, the German 
Bundesrat, the Hungarian Országgyuűlés, the Italian 
Camera dei Deputati, the Lithuanian Seimas, the Dutch 
Tweede Kamer, and in both Houses of the Romanian 
Parliament. Best practice examples are the Austrian 
Nationalrat and the Dutch Tweede Kamer, the only 
13   http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/statistiques-de-l-activite-parle-
mentaire-sous-la-xive-legislature
parliaments that have actually made regular use of the 
opportunity: In Austria, MEPs can speak during the 
so-called ‘Aktuelle Europastunden’ (topical EU hours) 
mentioned above. The parliamentary party group re-
sponsible by rotation for choosing the topic of the de-
bate can invite one MEP to speak. Dutch MEPs, in turn, 
have the opportunity to speak in the Tweede Kamer 
once a year, on the occasion of the debate on the Staat 
van de Europese Unie (State of the European Union. 
The experiences with the debates are so far, according 
to Valentin (2016), somewhat sobering: Austrian MEPs 
from domestic opposition parties often tend to fall back 
into a dominantly national mode criticising the national 
government even from a European perspective. Dutch 
MEPs, in contrast, take on a much more European per-
spective in their contributions, but provide an overall 
more negative picture of the EU than Austrian MEPs. 
One reason for these differences could be the different 
institutional setup. In the Netherlands, the State of the 
European Union address by the government covers EU 
issues from a more general perspective and thus pro-
vides MEPs with fewer opportunities to criticise specific 
governmental EU policies. In Austria, in contrast, the 
debates are focused on specific EU policies (such as EU 
migration policy) that allow for more targeted debates, 
but at the same time seem to encourage opposition 
MEPs to focus more strongly on domestic EU policy. 
Valentin also explains the fact that Austrian MEPs are 
overall somewhat more positive in their assessment of 
the EU with the rather strong public Euroscepticism 
in Austria, which Austrian MEPs from more europhile 
parties may try to address. Yet Valentin does conclude 
that it is ‘important to give MEPs a chance to represent 
the European Parliament at home. This way, it might 
be easier for the public to retrace actions of the EU and 
understand points of views that might strongly differ 
from those of their countries. Furthermore, this for-
mat can contribute to making the EU more authentic 
and transparent, as MEPs do not only try to shed good 
light on it, but also voice criticism’ (Kreilinger 2016: 6). 
3.5.2 Informing the citizens: 
parliamentary websites
In addition to plenary activities provision of information 
via their websites are arguably an important means of 
national parliaments to communicate EU issues to their 
citizens as they allow to provide extensive information 
to a broad public – provided that the information is easy 
to find and presented in an accessible way. In a recent 
COSAC report (2016b), almost all parliaments stated 
that they used their websites regularly to provide infor-
mation related to EU affairs to the public. And indeed, 
all parliaments make, albeit varying, efforts to ensure 
the transparency of their EU scrutiny by publishing min-
utes and web streams or summaries of the meetings, 
and by providing access to parliamentary or external 
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(EU and government) documents to citizens through 
the internet. Yet it remains rather questionable whether 
mere access to documents, highly relevant for special-
ist audiences, actually reaches the general public. As 
laudable as these efforts are, searching for and reading 
often highly technical documents on EU politics is not 
the most exciting activity and not one many citizens 
will spend considerable time on. More accessible web-
sites therefore bring together EU related parliamentary 
information for both general and specialised audiences. 
Best practice examples include the websites of the 
French Assemblée Nationale (www2.assemblee-na-
tionale.fr/15/autres-commissions/commission-des-af-
faires-europeennes), the Danish Folketing (http://www.
eu.dk), the Polish Sejm (oide.sejm.gov.pl) or the Swedish 
Riksdag (eu.riksdagen.se). Here, the parliaments have 
established genuine EU websites that provide com-
prehensive information on and direct links to parlia-
mentary activities and documents, including parlia-
mentary resolutions and reports on EU affairs or EU 
plenary debates, links to other EU related websites such 
as those of the EU institutions, the current EU presiden-
cy, COSAC or IPEX14. One especially laudable feature 
of the website of the Assemblée Nationale is the over-
view over recent topics dealt with in the committee on 
the start page. These are introduced with a short text 
outlining the most important information, while also 
providing links to the full parliamentary dossier. The 
extensive websites of the Riksdag or the Folketing’s 
EU Information Centre provide additional information 
on EU topics and policies, as well as, in the case of the 
Folketing, on specific issues on the EU agenda as well 
as a calendar with important meetings in parliament 
and EU institutions. Further links provide information 
on EU citizens’ rights and opportunities, information 
on the EU legislative process or statistical information 
on the EU and the member states. The Folketing’s EU 
Centre webpage even features a live chat with staff. A 
special feature of the EU website of Polish Sejm is the 
provision of lists of online newspapers dealing with 
EU affairs, links to research centres on EU studies and 
even a list of recent academic publications on national 
parliaments in the EU. 
In other parliaments, by contrast, EU affairs are mainly 
treated in a similar way as other policy areas, i.e. infor-
mation is usually limited to parliamentary EU issues, 
some basic background information on the EU as well as 
the position of parliament in EU affairs the provision of a 
few further links to EU institutions. Often, this informa-
tion is dispersed across the website with no direct and 
comprehensive access page for EU affairs apart from the 
EAC page. One example is the website of the German 
Bundestag (bundestag.de), where the page on ‘Europe 
in the Bundestag’ provides some general information 
on the involvement of the Bundestag in EU affairs, in-
14   InterParliamentary EU information eXchange, ipex.eu. See also below.
cluding links to the legal texts. Since the reorganisation 
of the website in 2016, all committee pages, including 
that of the EAC, are also organised according to dif-
ferent rubrics, including ‘reports from the committee 
and the plenary’ presenting summary information on 
recent issues pertaining to the committee portfolio as 
well as a list of committee documents. However, with 
the obvious exception of the EAC, the committee pag-
es feature no specific rubric for EU affairs; documents 
have to be searched for using either the Committee’s 
or the Bundestag’s search engines. 
Parliaments also vary with regard to more in-depth in-
formation they provide through their websites. Above, 
we already mentioned the parliamentary information 
reports of the Assemblée Nationale that are part of the 
regular scrutiny process and written under the respon-
sibility of a designated rapporteur from the committee. 
Some other examples include the academic service 
(Wissenschaftlicher Dienst) of the German Bundestag, 
which has its own EU unit and publishes the series ‘Top-
ical EU Term’ (‘Aktueller Begriff EU’), info letters on Eu-
rope as well as a range of research papers on EU issues, 
institutions and policy-making that are public (www.
bundestag.de/analysen). Similarly, the Parliamentary 
Research Office (Biuro Analiz Sejmowych) as well as 
the EU Documentation and Information Centre OIDE of 
the Polish Sejm regularly prepare research papers and 
shorter analyses that can be found on the websites. In 
the UK, we find a mixed system, with research papers 
and notes prepared by the House of Commons Library15 
and special reports prepared by the EAC that are the 
result of inquiries usually involving oral and written 
evidence by government or external actors. 
Finally, some parliaments are also present on facebook 
with their EACs (e.g. the Danish Folketing, www.face-
book.com/FolketingetsEUO) or twitter (e.g. Tweede 
Kamer twitter.com/EuZaTweedeKamer; House of 
Lords, twitter.com/lordseucom; Committee on Exit-
ing the EU in the House of Commons, (twitter.com/
CommonsEUexit), which not only allows for the pres-
entation of current events, documents or videos, but 
also for a direct interaction with the public, and some 
provide websites on EU issues dedicated specifically to 
a young audience. Here, an example is the ‘Democracy 
Lab’ (‘DemokratieWebstatt’, www.demokratiewebstatt.
at/thema/europa/ ) of the Austrian Parliament with a 
special section on the EU. It provides not only back-
ground information on the EU’s history or institutions 
as well as an overview over ’20 years of Austria in the 
EU’, but also informs about young peoples’ rights in the 
EU and offers online chats with MPs and MEPs. The 
Bundestag, in turn, has two websites, one for children 
(www.kuppelkucker.de) and one for young adults (www.
mitmischen.de), but only the latter provides informa-
tion on the EU. 
15   See: https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk
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4. Implementing the Lisbon provisions into  
the practical political process: general trends 
and ‘zooming in’ 
4.1 Use of the Lisbon tools across member 
states: some general trends
Due to the fact that not all of the Lisbon Treaty provi-
sions on national parliaments have been used yet16, we 
will in the following focus on the simplified Treaty re-
visions, the EWS and the Political Dialogue as well as 
inter-parliamentary cooperation. We first sketch overall 
trends across member states, to then be able to focus 
on specific examples. 
4.1.1 Simplified Treaty revision procedure
The simplified Treaty revision procedure has been used 
on three occasions so far: to amend the Protocol on 
Transitional Provisions annexed to the EU (OJ 2010, 
C263/1), the Protocol on the concerns of the Irish peo-
ple on the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 2013, L/60) and in order 
to add a third paragraph to Article 136 TFEU enabling 
the member states of the Eurozone to establish the Eu-
ropean Stability Mechanism (ESM). Neither of these 
amendments has been vetoed by a national parliament, 
but they have all been subject to parliamentary scrutiny 
and, where applicable, went through a ratification pro-
cess. Note that although NP still carry out this role with-
in their national borders, they are formally independent 
of their governments and directly involved in the EU 
treaty amendment process (Auel and Neuhold 2017).
4.1.2 The use of EWS: general observations
When it comes to the EWS, some national chambers 
have made very frequent use of the instrument, but par-
ticipation varies across member states (Jonsson Cornell 
and Goldoni 2016; Rozenberg 2017, see figure 7). Based 
on the numbers provided by the European Commission 
in its annual reports, the EWS has generated overall 354 
opinions during the period from 2010 to 2016. During 
these six years, the Swedish parliament has emerged as 
the ‘front-runner’ when it comes to the use of the tool 
(58 opinions) followed by the French Sénat (20), the 
16   So far, no NP has brought action before the CJEU, and the Joint Parliamen-
tary Scrutiny committee for the political monitoring of Europol and the 
evaluation of Eurojust’s activities has only recently (October 2017) been 
constituted (Kreilinger 2017). Also, no Convention has been convened 
since. 
Austrian Bundesrat (19), the Dutch Tweede Kamer (19), 
the UK House of Commons (18) and the Luxembourg 
Chambre des Députés (18). Please note, however, that 
the Commission only counts those opinions as reasoned 
opinions that are submitted within the eight weeks and 
clearly state the breach of subsidiarity. This may be one 
of the reasons why the counts of opinions tend to vary 
depending on who reports them, especially those self 
reported on IPEX. At the other end, we find a number 
of parliaments that have so far made hardly any use of 
the tool (3 opinions or fewer). Among them are very 
strong parliaments such as the Austrian Nationalrat, 
the Finnish Eduskunta (3), the Latvian Saeima or the 
Estonia Riigikogu or the German Bundestag, but also 
weaker parliaments such as The French Assemblée Na-
tionale, the Hellenic Parliament or the Belgian Sénat. 
In this context of the use of the EWS, it is noteworthy 
that the Dutch lower house, the Tweede Kamer not only 
uses the EWS rather actively, but puts forward propos-
als to improve the yellow procedure These proposals 
include the demand for more substantive responses by 
the Commission to the opinions submitted, increasing 
the eight-week deadline for yellow cards, the lowering 
of the threshold, and broadening of the EWS towards 
proportionality and legal base (Mastenbroek et.al 2004: 
iii, Dutch House of Representatives 2011).
As Rozenberg points out, the number of subsidiarity 
opinions sent annually inter alia depends on the number 
of legislative proposals that the Commission has put 
forward. The legislative productivity is seen to have 
decreased as of 2010. From 2010 to 2016, the Commis-
sion proposed an average of 127 texts annually as op-
posed to 271 for the previous seven years (Rozenberg 
2017). This decrease in legislative proposals – which 
can partly be seen as a result of the ‘Better Regulation 
Agenda’ of the European Commission – resulted in the 
phenomenon that national parliaments went hand in 
hand with less reasoned opinions. Another factor that 
is identified in the academic debate and which is seen 
to have an impact on the use of the tool across member 
states is that role conceptions differ across national par-
liaments. Some parliaments, with the Finnish Eduskunta 
being the most notable example, do not regard direct 
control over EU policy making as the responsibility of 
national parliaments (Mastenbroek et.al. 2014: 3; 24). 
Other parliaments, such as the Swedish Riksdag, see 
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it as paramount to contribute to the EWS and as such scrutinize every legislative proposal put forward by the 
European Commission (Hegeland 2015).
 
Figure 7: Number of Reasoned Opinions (EWS) by Chamber 2010 - 2016
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 Source: Annual Reports of the European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/info/annual-reports-relations-national-parliaments_en) 
Despite these different ‘role conceptions’, NP have been 
able to act together collectively in EU affairs and have 
so far issued three ‘yellow cards’.17 These have been 
issued on the proposal for the so-called ‘Monti II’ Reg-
ulation, on the Regulation on the establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office and most recently 
on the Posted Workers Directive18. Although ultimate-
ly unsuccessful19, the three yellow cards demonstrate 
that NP are not only prepared to put the tools to use, 
but also coordinate across national borders. This was 
especially the case with the card on Monti II (Chris-
tensen 2015; Cooper 2015; Neuhold and Högenauer 
2016). The Danish parliament, which held the COSAC 
presidency at the time, used both the network of par-
17   In the context of this study, we cannot address the question why only 
three yellow cards have been issued so far. 
18   12 parliaments with 19 votes overall submitted a reasoned opinion on 
the so-called Monti II proposal (Commission 2012). On the ‘Proposal for 
a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Pros-
ecutor’s Office’ (COM/2013/534), the Commission received reasoned 
opinions from 11 parliaments representing 19 votes. 11 parliaments also 
submitted 22 reasoned opinions on the proposal ‘Posting of Workers 
Directice’  (COM/1991/230).
19   In the case of the Monti II regulation, the Commission subsequently with-
drew the proposal, but stated that a breach of the subsidiarity principle 
was not evident in the parliamentary opinions. Rather, the proposal was 
withdrawn because it was ‘unlikely to gather the necessary political sup-
port within the EP and the Council’ (European Commission 2012: 1). Regard-
ing the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Commission decided to 
maintain the proposal despite the yellow card (European Commission 
2013). Finally, with regard to the most recent yellow card the Commission 
stated that the proposal did not constitute a breach of the subsidiarity 
principle (European Commission 2016).
liamentary liaison officers20 in Brussels as well as the 
COSAC meeting to mobilise other parliaments and to 
circulate an example of a reasoned opinion for other 
legislatures to follow. The network of liaison officers 
then kept parliaments regularly informed about the 
developments towards the card and helped to increase 
the number of reasoned opinions. 
National parliaments flagged the yellow card a second 
time in 2013. When examining the reasoned opinions 
put forward by the different legislatures on the estab-
lishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, it 
becomes apparent that they differ greatly (Fromage 
2016). As Rozenberg points out, some parliaments were 
in fact opposed to the proposal as such and ‘hid’ behind 
the subsidiarity principle. Other legislatures were in 
favour of the office but concerned by the fact that the 
European Commission would control this body. For yet 
others the proposal did not go far enough. As a result 
of this divergence, the Commission left the proposal 
unchanged (Rozenberg 2017: 29).
The yellow card on the Posted Worker directive, in turn, 
is an interesting case as ten out of eleven parliaments 
were from Eastern and Central Europe. As Kreilinger21 
20   A majority of national parliaments sends parliamentary officials – so-
called ‘liaison officers’ – that are mainly based within the premises of the 
EP (see: Neuhold and Högenauer 2016).
21  See: http://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/opinion/
national-parliaments-3rd-yellow-card-a-preliminary-assessment/
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points out, these legislatures can be seen to form a ‘re-
gional block’ as opposed to NP from Western Europe 
who were overall more in support of the proposal.
4.1.3 Use of Political Dialogue
When looking across the use of the Political Dialogue 
(figure 8), a differentiated picture emerges, just like with 
the EWS. Some parliaments such as the Portuguese 
Assembleia have made extensive use of the Political 
Dialogue. The Portuguese legislature used to send an 
opinion on virtually every legislative document and in 
most cases simply indicating their agreement with the 
proposal. It did so in order to formulate a parliamenta-
ry position on EU affairs independent of the national 
government and to acquire information separate from 
the executive (Jančić 2012). Here we can however see 
a decline of activity, ranging from 183 opinions sub-
mitted in 2011 and 226 opinions put forward in 2013, 
to 55 and 56 opinions sent in 2015 and 2016 respec-
tively22. On the one hand, this can be explained by the 
trend, alluded to above, that the Juncker Commission 
put forward a decreasing number of draft proposals. 
On the other hand this can also be explained by the 
fact that the Portuguese assembly stopped to send an 
opinion for acknowledging the transmission legislative 
proposals in 2015.
22   See annual reports from European Commission on “relations between the 
European Commission and national parliaments” from 2010 to 2016. 
 
Figure 8: Number of Opinions (Political Dialogue) by Chamber 2010 – 2016
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Source: Annual Reports of the European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/info/annual-reports-relations-national-parliaments_en) 
Other legislatures being very active ‘users’ of the tool 
were upper houses such as the Italian Senate who sub-
mitted around 437 opinions during the period of 2010-
2016, the Czech Senate with 286 opinions and the Ger-
man Bundesrat with 236 opinions for the same period. 
This is in line with the observation that the EWS allows 
upper chambers to ‘compensate for their somewhat 
marginal role within the national accountability chain’ 
(Neuhold and Strelkov 42: 21). Two counter examples, 
however, where the lower house is more active than 
the upper house, are France with 130 opinions by the 
Assemblée Nationale vs. 53 by the Sénat, or Romania, 
where the chamber of deputies submitted 246 opinions 
as opposed to the Senate with 127 opinions.
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4.1.4 Inter-parliamentary cooperation:  
general trends
Turning to inter-parliamentary cooperation, this tool 
is seen as a precondition for the EWS to work, in order 
to exchange opinions and arguments across national 
boundaries. In a study, commissioned by the Dutch 
lower house, the main channels for inter-parliamenta-
ry cooperation were seen to be COSAC, the network 
of administrative liaisons in Brussels, and IPEX (Mas-
tenbroek et.al. 2014). We will briefly shed light on these 
different fora and mechanisms before examining In-
ter-Parliamentary Conferences that were established 
within specific policy fields.
COSAC is seen as the key formal venue for inter-parlia-
mentary cooperation. COSAC meetings take place twice 
a year, and are organised and chaired by the parliament 
of the country holding the rotating Presidency. As such 
COSAC has a role in ‘show-casing’ the importance of 
the rotating Presidency of the EU as COSAC meetings 
usually take place in the capital of the Member State 
holding the Chair.23 As shown above COSAC can take 
on a key role in amassing support for yellow cards. 
COSAC has been criticised, however, as MPs presently 
do not have a mandate (Mastenbroek et.al. 2004: 27) 
and plenary sessions that allow for little discussion and 
interaction due to the dominance of prepared speeches 
(Rozenberg 2017). Under the Dutch Presidency (during 
the first half of 2016) one thus opted for more interac-
tive formats, for example topical discussion and parallel 
working groups. 
Note that cooperation across parliaments not only takes 
place at the level of directly elected MPs but also at the 
level of parliamentary officials. The most established 
form of cooperation is that of parliamentary liaisons in 
Brussels, which together have been described to form 
an information network. As alluded to above, a majori-
ty of national parliaments delegate officials that are for 
the most part based in the premises of the EP. Liaisons 
have been ascribed a ‘bridge-building function’ across 
national parliaments and are seen as a hub for informa-
tion exchange. A main instrument in this quest are the 
so-called Monday Morning Meetings often held on a 
weekly basis (Neuhold and Högenauer 2016). Moreover, 
IPEX is noteworthy insofar as this is a platform for in-
formation exchange between national parliaments and 
the European Parliament. IPEX contains information 
such as on the progress of scrutiny in member states 
and any reasoned opinions. In addition, it is the only 
place where all the subsidiarity deadlines are calculat-
ed and published. Parliaments make different use of 
23   Each delegation consists of six members from EACs from national par-
liaments, and six members of the European Parliament. Often, COSAC 
invites guest speakers such as European Commissioners or representa-
tives of the rotating presidency. In addition to the biannual meetings, the 
chairpersons of EACs also meet twice a year within COSAC.
IPEX which some also adding national documents, for 
example. In general, documents are uploaded following 
the internal rules for scrutiny of each national parlia-
ment24, and the countries that upload most documents 
on IPEX are Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the Czech and French Sénat and the Polish 
Sejm. There seems to be no clear link between the is-
suing of reasoned opinions and uploading documents. 
In general, IPEX has been criticised for being not be-
ing updated and translation of documents not being 
available (Mastenbroek et al. 2014), but over the past 
years the platform has come to publish 100 per cent 
of translations for reasoned opinions and more than 
75 per cent for political dialogue documents, either in 
English or French. 
As mentioned earlier, based on the TEU and the Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) IPC 
has also flourished in institutional terms (see Kreilinger 
2013a and Rozenberg 2017: 33 ff. for overview and dis-
cussion). Most notable in this context are the Inter-Par-
liamentary Conferences on CFSP and CSDP which, were 
established in 2012 and within the domain Economic 
and Financial Governance in 2013. The establishment 
of both conferences were however plagued by inter- and 
intra-institutional rivalries. As Kreilinger (2013b) points 
out: the conflicts prevalent during the establishment of 
the Inter-Parliamentary Conference for Economic and 
Financial Governance are ‘an example for the conflict 
lines with respect to the role of national parliaments 
in a political union: for conflict lines between differ-
ent sub-groups of national parliaments, between the 
EU institutions (and between the EU level and the na-
tional level’ (Kreilinger 2013b: 10). In turn the debates 
on establishment of the Conferences in the domain of 
CFSP and CSDP are also described as a ‘reaffirmation 
of authority claimed by both the NP and the EP’ (Her-
ranz-Surrallés 2014).
The meetings themselves have gained in dynamism as 
the example of the Conference on CFSP/CSDP shows. 
One the hand, issues beyond the security in the narrow 
sense are on the agenda, such as trade or migration 
policy and the discussions have moved from lengthy 
speeches to more dynamic question and answer ses-
sions. Note also that this is not the only development 
in this domain; the EP Foreign Affairs Committee also 
organises inter-parliamentary meetings on specific top-
ics in Brussels (Rozenberg 2017: 39). It is noteworthy 
that a Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group on Europol 
(JPSG, Kreilinger 2017) had its constitutive meeting on 
9 and 10 October 2017.25 Pursuant to Article 88 TFEU, 
the new Europol Regulation, which entered into force 
24   See: http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/parliaments/neparliaments.do
25   The European Parliament delegation consists of 16 members while each 
national parliament can delegate up to 4 members. 
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on 1 May 2017, created this joint scrutiny system ena-
bling a “democratic control on Europol”. 26
4.2 Conditions for and use of the Lisbon  
tools in selected member states: zooming in
In this section we will focus on selected parliaments 
that can be seen, as shown above, ‘European players’ 
insofar as they either contribute actively to the EWS or 
to the Political Dialogue. When it comes to the EWS, 
the Swedish Riksdag has been flagged as the main ‘user’ 
of the system, followed by the French Senate and the 
Dutch lower and upper houses. When it comes to the 
Political Dialogue, Portugal has been very active, fol-
lowed by the Italian Senate and the Czech Senate, the 
German Bundesrat and both Romanian parliamenta-
ry chambers. We will thus shed light on practices of 
parliamentary control in these selected parliaments in 
order to discern whether one can establish patterns of 
‘best practice’. 
This section will focus on an aspect that is highlighted 
as being a key pillar of parliaments playing a role within 
both the EWS and the Political Dialogue: a system to 
select documents that should be subject to parliamen-
tary scrutiny.
4.2.1 Selection of proposals subject to  
parliamentary scrutiny: some (best) practices 
In Sweden it is noteworthy that there is no pre-selection 
of documents, insofar as the Swedish Riksdag act states 
that the Riksdag has to examine whether draft legisla-
tion conflicts with the principle of subsidiarity. In this 
context, the Riksdag receives virtually all official doc-
uments from the European Commission. Parliamentary 
scrutiny is decentralised as the parliamentary cham-
ber refers a draft legislative act to the committee with 
‘responsibility for the matter at hand’ to be examined. 
Note that each parliamentary committee is made up of 
17 members of the Riksdag and as such a committee is 
like a ‘miniature Riksdag’. Its composition thus reflects 
the composition of the Riksdag as a whole.27 The par-
liamentary committees monitor EU affairs within their 
respective areas of responsibility.28
As such, it is the committees that are obliged to examine 
EU proposals that fall within their realm of responsi-
bility to ensure their compliance with the principle of 
26  See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/127261/libe-newslet-
ter-september2017.pdf
27   The largest party in the Riksdag also has the most members in each com-
mittee.
28   See: http://www.riksdagen.se/en/committees/the-parliamentary-com-
mittees-at-work/.
subsidiarity. The government has to provide its assess-
ment of the principle of subsidiarity within two weeks 
that the committee puts forward a request. Given that 
the committee considers that the proposal conflicts 
with the principle of subsidiarity, it can communicate 
to the chamber (by way of a statement) that the Riks-
dag should send a reasoned opinion to the Presidents 
of the EP, the Commission and the Council. If at least 
5 out of the 17 committee members so request, the 
committee is under obligation to submit a statement 
to the chamber. If this is not the case, then an extract 
of the minutes of the committee meeting is sent to the 
chamber (stating that the draft does not conflict with 
the subsidiarity principle). Sectoral committees are thus 
the pillars of subsidiarity control and the EAC plays no 
role, which allows for a specialization on policy issues 
(Hegeland 2015: 432f.).
Another parliamentary chamber that has been described 
as a ‘European player’ is the Dutch lower house. Also 
here EU affairs have been ‘mainstreamed’ by making 
the sectoral committees responsible for the discussion 
of legislative proposals and other documents. As op-
posed to Sweden, however, there is a systematic prior-
itisation of Commission proposals on the basis of the 
Commission’s annual Work Programme. The Dutch 
lower house thus conducts a systematic analysis of the 
Commission’s plans for the upcoming year since 2007. 
First the sectoral committees conduct scrutiny of those 
aspects of the Work Programme that affect them. The 
EAC then invites the cabinet member assigned to EU 
affairs to discuss the document. Subsequently, an in-
tegrated list of priorities is adopted by plenary. Since 
2010 this document contains an indication on which 
proposals the chamber will submit a scrutiny reserve 
or whether it plans to carry out a subsidiarity test. In 
order to strengthen the link with the EU ‘executive’, 
the Commission, the EACs of both houses hold a joint 
debate with the European Commissioner for inter-in-
stitutional relations before finally deciding on their pri-
orities (Högenauer 2015: 254f.). 
Yet, another parliamentary chamber that has been rath-
er active, especially compared to the lower house, is 
the upper house of the French parliament, the French 
Senate. The Senate has ‘actively adapted’ to the EWS 
as opposed to the lower house, the National Assem-
bly. Accordingly, the scrutiny procedures of the Senate 
were substantially reorganized in autumn of 2011 after 
the appointment of a new chair. In order to be able to 
cope with the eight weeks deadline prevalent under the 
EWS, the chairman set up a working group on subsidi-
arity composed of one representative per party group. 
This working group meets before EAC meetings and 
selects the drafts that need to be scrutinized further. 
A rapporteur then presents a draft reasoned opinion 
to the EAC. The group has set the ‘mandate’ for itself 
to only put forward comments on subsidiarity issues 
‘Europeanisation’ of  National Parliaments in European Union Member States: Experiences and Best Practices 31
and not on content of legislative drafts (Thomas and 
Tacea 2015: 182f.). 
Both the Italian and the Czech upper house are also 
active users of the ‘Lisbon tools’, especially the Politi-
cal Dialogue. In Italy the Senate has developed (after 
2006) a procedure for the EWS that is very different 
from the Italian lower house. Whereas in the Chamber 
of Deputies, the EAC is the sole committee responsi-
ble, in the President of the Senate forwards EU draft 
legislation to both the sectoral committee responsible 
and the EAC. The committees examine the proposal 
and approve a resolution. The EAC can substitute for 
the committee, given that there are problems with the 
eight week deadline. In the Political Dialogue it is the 
EAC that plays a crucial role (Cavatorto 2015: 220-222). 
In the Czech Republic, on the other hand, the EAC is 
attributed a key role in parliamentary scrutiny, both in 
the upper and lower house. It is interesting however 
that in the Czech Republic a special body has been set 
up: the Parliamentary Institute which has a dedicated 
EU Affairs department. This body plays a crucial role 
in the selection of which documents are to be submitted 
to subsidiarity checks, especially in the lower house. 
Parliamentary staff play an important role also in the 
EAC of the Senate when it comes to selection of items 
that are to be submitted to parliamentary control. While 
under the Political Dialogue the Senate has ‘consciously 
tried to develop a high profile on EU affairs’ this tool 
has not been seen to deliver any tangible new leverage 
in the relationship with the EU institutions (Hrabalek 
and Strelkov 2015: 496). 
Another parliament where the upper house has been a 
more active ‘European player’ than the Lower House, 
is the German legislature. The German Bundesrat has 
been active in the Political Dialogue from the start and 
consistently increased its output. This higher output 
might be driven by the fact that the Bundesrat has ad-
ditional administrative resources; all 16 administra-
tions of the German Länder scrutinize EU proposals 
(Höing 2015: 201).
As mentioned above, the Portuguese parliament stands 
out especially, when it comes to the use of the Political 
Dialogue. This is based on the fact that Portuguese par-
liament tried to ‘maximize the utilization of the Lisbon 
Treaty prerogatives of national parliaments’ (Jančić 
2015: 376), and accordingly the EAC adopted a new 
mechanism for the scrutiny of EU proposals in Janu-
ary 2010. The reform foresaw three types of scrutiny 
procedure that all relate to Commission proposals: en-
hanced, normal and urgent. Additionally a procedure for 
enforcing the subsidiarity principle was also laid down. 
Enhanced scrutiny builds on the positive experiences 
with the Political Dialogue and concentrates on the 
Commission’s Legislative and Work Programme. The 
pre-selection of documents under enhanced scrutiny 
begins with the assessing the criterion of whether the 
EU initiative is relevant for Portugal. Each parliamentary 
committee then notifies the EAC whether it intends to 
submit a Commission proposal to enhanced scrutiny. 
The EAC then selects 6 proposals maximum per year 
that should be submitted to enhanced scrutiny. The 
EAC then, again together with the sectoral committee 
responsible, drafts a ‘tailor-made’ scrutiny programme 
for each selected proposal in a way that one can comply 
with the eight week deadline. Normal scrutiny implies a 
decentralization or mainstreaming of EU affairs insofar 
as draft proposals from the Commission are forward-
ed by the EAC to sectoral committees for information 
or for the adoption of a report. Given that it does the 
latter, the sectoral committee has to do so within six 
weeks of receiving the Portuguese version of the draft. 
It is then sent back to the EAC, which drafts its own 
opinion within the remaining two weeks. Urgent scruti-
ny applies if the EAC finds that a certain EU proposal 
has raised concerns in national parliaments. Normally 
the EAC would be alerted to this either by way of IPEX 
or its liaison officer in Brussels. In this case the EAC 
prepares its opinion and request and if it so wishes, the 
opinion of the relevant sectoral committee (Jančić, 2015: 
376f.). When it comes to subsidiarity control, as of 2013, 
sectoral committees conduct that assessment (before it 
was the plenary) but the substantial verdict of whether 
subsidiarity was violated remains the prerogative of 
the EAC. Moreover public hearings are held on green 
and white papers and as such strengthen the ex ante 
scrutiny of parliament (Jančić, 2015: 376f.). Overall, in 
Portugal one can thus observe an interesting inter-play 
between the EAC and sectoral committees; a certain 
degree of decentralization to committees but the EAC 
still assuming an important role. 
The Romanian parliament is an example where both 
chambers try to control the government in EU affairs, 
but this is only the case since 2011. The period of 2007-
2011 is seen as being characterized by a ‘total absence 
of control’ of governmental policies in EU issues due 
to the lack of expertise of MPs and because of deficient 
parliamentary procedures (Tacea 2015, 615). As the re-
sult of a new governmental coalition, the political will 
to control the executive increased and each chamber 
set up an EAC to undertake similar tasks. From then 
on both chambers have tried to play an active role in 
the EWS and the Political Dialogue. As the example of 
the lower house shows, the EAC plays a key role in the 
EWS as it adopts the final decision, which is then voted 
on and debated by plenary or directly sent to the gov-
ernment and the EU institutions. Standing committees 
are however involved and play an advisory role and 
can submit a draft of a reasoned opinion to the EAC 
(Tacea 2015: 623).
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5. (Other) factors that enable national  
parliaments to play a role in EU affairs
This section sheds light on certain factors that contrib-
ute to national parliaments playing a more active role 
in EU affairs generally – and thus regardless of the spe-
cific arena. As outlined in the previous sections, par-
liaments mainly suffer from one overarching problem, 
namely limited resources. We have already discussed 
some more specific means parliaments employ to over-
come the problem. Here, we focus on general factors 
that impact parliamentary ability to fulfil their roles in 
EU affairs effectively, namely access to information, 
the support through parliamentary staff as well as the 
designation of rapporteurs. 
5.1 Access to information
Effective scrutiny depends to a large degree on the 
amount, but especially on the quality of information 
parliaments receive. Since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments receive all public 
documents directly from the European institutions, in-
cluding the Commission’s green and white papers and 
communications. A large number of parliaments now 
also receive so-called Explanatory Memorandums on 
EU legislative proposals that outline the proposal as 
well as the governments (initial) views on the content 
including subsidiarity issues, and most parliaments also 
receive the information within the eight week deadline, 
either automatically or upon request (table 5). 
There are, however, differences with regard to the pro-
vision of non-public documents, such as limité, confi-
dential or secret documents, COREPER and working 
group papers or internal briefings (table 6). Especially 
information on the actual conduct of the negotiations in 
the Council, and especially during the earlier stages in 
COREPER or the Council working groups, is still often 
difficult for parliaments to come by. Counterexamples 
are the Italian Camera dei Deputi, where the Italian 
Permanent Representative has to provide the parlia-
mentary liaison with all information pertaining to EU 
negotiations, including trilogues, minutes of COREPER 
and Council working groups, and detailed documents on 
the Italian position (for this and the following: Masten-
broek et al. 2014: 14ff.). The German Bundestag also has 
similarly extensive access to documents, for example on 
informal ministerial meetings, COREPER, and Council 
working groups. In addition, the Bundestag also receives 
the ‘coordinated instructions for the German represent-
ative’ on COREPER and reports from the Permanent 
Representation.29 Most information and documents 
are made available through the electronic information 
system EuDoX, and all documents are accompanied by 
government opinions (doppeltes Ueberweisungsverfahren). 
Other parliaments mostly receive information through 
reports from the government on Council negotiations, 
such as in Finland and Sweden; or through ‘pre-’ and 
‘post-briefings’ on Council meetings, such as in Belgium. 
While the Polish government must submit to the Sejm 
written information ‘on the progress of EU law-making 
procedures and information on the Republic of Poland’s 
positions taken in the course of those procedures’, it 
must also inform the Sejm of ‘Poland’s participation in 
the activities of the EU at least twice a year.30 For an, 
albeit somewhat out-dated, overview see the informa-
tion collected by COSAC (Table 6 below).
29   See the Act on Cooperation between the Federal Government and the 
German Bundestag in matters concerning the European Union, 4 July 2013. 
 Available online: www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/
a21/legalbasis/euzbbg/248870. 
30   As established in the ‘Cooperation Act’, 13 February 2011. See: http://oide.
sejm.gov.pl/oide/en/#2.1 
‘Europeanisation’ of  National Parliaments in European Union Member States: Experiences and Best Practices 33
Table 5: Submission of Government Reports or Explanatory Memorandums within 8 week deadline
Parliament/Chamber Always Upon Request Sometimes Rarely Never
Austrian Nationalrat and Bundesrat X
Belgian Chambre des représentants X
Belgian Sénat X
Croatian Hrvatski sabor X
Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon X
Czech Poslanecká sněmovna X
Czech Senát X
Danish Folketing X
Dutch Tweede Kamer X
Dutch Eerste Kamer X
Estonian Riigikogu X
Finnish Eduskunta X
French Assemblée nationale X
French Sénat X
German Bundestag X
German Bundesrat X
Greek Vouli ton Ellinon X
Hungarian Országgyűlés X
Irish Houses of the Oireachtas X
Italian Camera dei deputati X
Italian Senato della Repubblica X
Latvian Saeima X
Lithuanian Seimas X
Luxembourg Chambre des Députés X
Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati X
Polish Sejm X
Polish Senat X
Portuguese Assembleia da República X
Romanian Camera Deputaţilor X
Romanian Senat X
Slovak Národná rada X
Slovenian National Assembly X
Spanish Cortes Generales X
Swedish Riksdag X
UK House of Commons X
UK House of Lords X
 
Source: COSAC 2017a, data based on individual questionnaires. 
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Table 6: Access to Documents (by Parliament/Chamber) 
Chamber  Public  Limité
 EU 
Restricted
 EU  
Confidential
 EU 
Secret
 EU Top 
secret
 COREPER
 Council 
WG
 Briefings
AU Nationalrat + Bundesrat*** Both Both Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt. Both Both
BE Chambre des représentants Govt. Govt. Govt.
BE Sénat Govt.    Govt.
BG Narodno Sabranie*** Both Govt. Govt. Govt.
CY Vouli ton Antiprosopon** Govt. Govt.
CZ Poslanecká sněmovna*** Both Both Govt. Both Both Both
CZ Senát*** Both Both Govt. Both Both Database 
DE Bundestag* Both Both Govt. Both Govt. Database Database
DE Bundesrat* Both Both Govt. Govt. Both Both
DK Folketing*** Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt.
EE Riigikogu*** Both Both Database Database Govt.
EL Vouli ton Ellinon** Govt. Govt. Govt.
ES Cortes Generales*** Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt.
FI Eduskunta*** Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt.
FR Assemblée nationale * Both Both Both Govt. Both Both Govt.
FR Sénat* Both Both Both Both Both Both Both
HU Országgyűlés*** Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt.
IE Houses of the Oireachtas Govt.  Govt.
IT Camera dei Deputati*** Both Both Both Both
IT Senato della Repubblica*** Both Both Both Both Both
LT Seimas* Both Both Both Both Database Database Database
LU Chambre des Députés*** Govt.
LV Saeima***
Data-
base
Data-
base
Database Database Database
MT Kamra tad-Deputati* Govt.
NL Tweede Kamer*** Govt.
NL Eerste Kamer*** Govt.
PL Sejm***
PL Senat***
PT Assembleia da República*** Govt. Govt. . Govt. Govt.
RO Camera Deputaţilor** Both Govt. Govt.
RO Senatul*** Govt. Govt.
SE Riksdag*** Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt.  
SK Národná rada*** Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt. Govt.
SL Državni zbor* Both Govt. Govt.
SL Državni svet*** Govt. Govt.
UK House of Commons*** Govt. Govt.
UK House of Lords * Both Govt. Govt.
Source: COSAC 2012a; Govt.: documents sent to Parliaments/Chambers by the Government; Database: access to documents through a Government 
database; Both: documents sent by the Government and accessed through a Government database. * documents sent automatically by the Government; 
** documents have to be requested by the Parliament/Chamber; *** some documents are sent and others have to be requested.
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5.2 Selection/Prioritisation of EU documents 
and ‘making MPs responsible’ for EU affairs
5.2.1 Selection and prioritisation of  
EU documents/dossiers
Given that most parliaments have long complained 
rather about suffering from an information overflow 
than from too little information in EU affairs (Auel and 
Benz 2005; Bergmann 2000: 417), it depends to a large 
extent on the capacities of parliamentary committees 
to deal with and process the information they receive 
from both the EU and their government. This is also 
related to the general approach to scrutiny, i.e. whether 
parliaments decide to focus on the in-depth scrutiny of 
selected EU dossiers or to emphasise a more encom-
passing approach. The latter has the advantage that 
parliaments is comprehensively informed on all EU de-
cisions, therefore also less likely to overlook important 
developments and can, in the ideal scenario, keep the 
government ‘constantly on its toes’. The disadvantag-
es are, however, also clear: a very broad approach is 
extremely time consuming, scrutiny may remain more 
superficial, and given the large number of less important 
technical documents, is not always worth the effort. 
In other words, there may be a trade-off between the 
quantity and quality of parliamentary scrutiny. 
Parliaments mostly rely on their administrative staff 
to assist them (see below 5.4), but have also developed 
other means to select and prioritise EU documents for 
scrutiny – either continuously or through ex ante se-
lection. A long-standing example for the former, is the 
European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) of the House of 
Commons. The main task of the ESC is to examine all 
EU documents on an on-going basis and to filter out 
those, which it considers legally and/or politically im-
portant. Selected documents are referred for public 
debate to an, ad hoc convened, European Union Com-
mittee or, exceptionally, to the Committee of the Whole 
House. An example for the latter is the prioritisation of 
selected EU issues or legislative dossiers on the basis of 
the scrutiny of the Commission Work Program (CWP). 
The advantage is not only that parliamentary scrutiny 
can be targeted towards the most important or sensitive 
dossiers, but also that parliaments can prepare for the 
publication of the Commission proposal and thus obtain 
necessary information ahead of time, for example by 
holding expert hearings or by alerting the specialised 
standing committees as well as their government to 
need for more detailed information. This practice was 
originally developed by the Dutch Tweede Kamer in 
2007 (see Högenauer 2015: 254). Here, the EAC discuss-
es the work program together with the cabinet member 
assigned to EU affairs, while the standing committees 
additionally scrutinize the sections pertaining to their 
portfolio. The Tweede Kamer also organises, together 
with the Upper House, a debate on the CWP with the 
European Commissioner for inter-institutional relations. 
On this basis, a list of priority issues is drawn up that 
is adopted in the plenary and contains indications on 
which documents the Parliament wishes to place a scru-
tiny reserve on or to submit to a subsidiarity test. The 
result of the prioritizing procedure is a highly selective 
scrutiny: out of several hundred initiatives contained 
in a Commission proposal, the Tweede Kamer usually 
only selects about a handful for scrutiny and the sub-
sidiarity test each. The practice of using the CWP has 
now spread to a range of other parliaments as well, al-
though it is unclear whether the procedures are simi-
larly elaborate: According to COSAC report (2016a), 22 
of the responding parliaments chambers had set their 
scrutiny priorities on the basis of the 2016 CWP and 
five intended to do so. 
In Bulgaria, for example, the National Assembly also 
established a prioritising process very early (in 2007), in 
which the EAC together with the standing committees 
sets up its own Annual Working Programme on EU is-
sues and draft EU acts, which allows for the discussion 
and formulation of ex ante positions on EU legislation it 
considers important before the publication of the initi-
ative by the European Commission (Kanev 2015: 449). 
In Croatia, the government is obliged to present to par-
liament, by mid-January of each year, a list of draft leg-
islative acts it expects to be discussed at the EU level. 
The parliament uses this list, as well as the CWP and 
the work programmes of the respective Council Presi-
dencies to draw its own work program for the coming 
year (Butkovic 2015: 465). The government must then 
provide the parliament access to all documents relat-
ed to the parliamentary work programme though the 
governmental EU database as well as all additional 
information concerning the legislative process and its 
own position. The advantage is, again a very focused 
and targeted scrutiny. A potential disadvantage howev-
er, seems to be the limited access to the governmental 
EU database dependent on the insertion of an EU draft 
proposal into the parliamentary work program. 
5.2.2 Designating MPs responsible for EU affairs
Another strategy to in the quest of enhancing parlia-
mentary scrutiny is to, as Mastenbroek et.al. (2014) 
point out, attribute the responsibility for certain dos-
siers/issues to MPs. The Polish Sejm uses a system of 
rapporteurs who are assigned to EU legislative propos-
als. These rapporteurs are MPs of the EAC who have 
an interest in the Commission proposal under scrutiny. 
In the case a reasoned opinion is adopted, it is also the 
task of the rapporteur to draft the opinion. He or she 
is also responsible to attend the relevant EU meetings 
or inter-parliamentary meeting were the proposal is 
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discussed. However, the rapporteur has no mandate 
from the EAC and cannot represent the views of the 
whole Polish Sejm at such meetings, if there is no ple-
nary agreement or already an agreement on issuing an 
reasoned opinion (Mastenbroek et.al. 2014).
The Belgian lower house has introduced a system of pro-
moters’: every sectoral committee has appointed such a 
Europromoter among its members, who has the task to 
follow the EU policy making processes that are relevant 
for the committee. The idea is that these MPs stimulate 
other committee members to study and scrutinize Euro-
pean legislative dossiers. Moreover, the Europromoter 
is formally responsible for drafting a reasoned opinion 
under the EWS, and could thus potentially stimulate 
the scrutiny of subsidiarity issues. 
In Portugal as of 2013 an MP is appointed as rapporteur 
on the basis of European Council agendas and infor-
mation furnished by the government and is asked to 
monitor these matters on behalf of parliament (Jančić, 
2015: 377).
5.3 Mainstreaming: involvement of  
the specialised standing committees
The capacity to deal with European issues also depends 
on the number of committees involved in European Af-
fairs as well as their ‘jurisdictions’. In some parliaments, 
the EAC is the main forum for dealing with European 
issues, with more or less intensive cooperation with or 
consultation of the specialised standing committees. In 
other parliaments, the specialised standing committees 
are responsible for the scrutiny of European issues in 
their specific policy areas. The trade-off between the 
two options is quite straightforward. European Affairs 
Committees can develop the necessary expertise with 
regard to the functioning of the European political sys-
tem and decision-making the specialised standing com-
mittees might lack. In addition, EACs may develop a 
more integrated view on European issues. On the other 
hand, they have to deal with all European issues that 
cover a range of policy areas that is almost as broad as 
in domestic politics. 
Delegating EU scrutiny to standing committees or set-
ting up specialist sub-committees, in turn, has the ad-
vantage that a larger number of parliamentarians are 
involved in EU affairs thus increasing both awareness 
and ownership of European affairs throughout parlia-
ment. Even more importantly, scrutiny of EU policy is 
informed by their specialist policy expertise. Experienc-
es indicate, however, that as long as the involvement of 
the specialized committees is not mandatory, or where 
they lack any formal decision-making powers regarding 
parliamentary mandates or resolutions, they are at times 
slow to respond. The Danish parliament, for example, 
has introduced some measure of mainstreaming - while 
keeping the right to issue mandates or reasoned EWS 
opinions strictly within the EAC - especially by involving 
the standing committees in the EWS and obliging them 
to provide their opinion on legislative proposals if the 
EAC asks them to. Yet the contributions by the commit-
tees vary, depending on engagement of the individual 
MPs, and especially the Chairmen (Christensen 2015: 
278). In addition, members of the standing committees 
have on occasion expressed resentment in interviews 
over ‘having to work for the EAC’ and not being able 
to issue mandates or reasoned opinions themselves. 
Christensen also points out (2012) that the involvement 
of the standing committees is further complicated by 
the fact that they operate according to a different logic 
than the EAC. While proceedings in the EAC are marked 
by a broad consensus on most EU issues and a cooper-
ative style amongst the parties, the other committees 
follow a much more competitive ‘government versus 
opposition’ logic. 
Here, best practices combine the best of both worlds 
by largely delegating to the standing committees, but 
involving the EAC simultaneously as the lead commit-
tee or as the main mediator between the committees 
involved. 
In the Swedish Riksdag, for example, scrutiny is decen-
tralised, but the mandating rights rest with the EAC. The 
standing committees participate at an early stage in EU 
policy making. The government therefore provides in-
formation to the committees about work in progress at 
EU working group and COREPER level, and preferably 
before these stages. The committees can then invite 
cabinet or ministerial representatives to discuss the 
EU proposal in detail. Result of the scrutiny is either a 
written statement or the formation of an oral position, 
which is included in the committee minutes. Both pro-
vide an important basis for the negotiation mandate 
that is given by the EAC prior to Council negotiations. 
In Finland, the government must inform the Eduskunta 
without delay of proposals for Council decisions and of 
other EU matters, usually through a letter outlining the 
content of a European document and the Cabinet’s po-
sition on it. The speaker of the Eduskunta then forwards 
the matter to the Grand Committee and requests one or 
– in the majority of cases – more standing committee(s) 
to give their opinion to the Grand Committee. The des-
ignated standing committees have a constitutional right, 
but also obligation, to report to the Grand Committee 
(Section 96 of the Finnish Constitution), but in less sa-
lient questions at least some committees just indicate 
their position briefly in the minutes of the committee 
meeting (for example, that the committee agrees with 
the government position) (Raunio 2015: 410 f.). If more 
than one specialised committee delivers an opinion, 
the Grand Committee summarises and mediates. After 
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debating the issue, the Grand Committee formulates a 
parliamentary recommendation in the form of a sum-
mary from the chair and forwards it to the government. 
According to Raunio, the Grand Committee agrees with 
the opinion from the standing committees in 90 to 95 
per cent of the cases (Raunio 2015: 412). 
In the German Bundestag and the Tweede Kamer, the 
specialised committees deal with EU policies with-
in their policy areas, while the EAC is the committee 
responsible for all fundamental matters of European 
integration, but also acts as mediator between and co-
ordinates the standing committees. Yet at least in the 
Bundestag, the result is a rather lengthy procedure: The 
Bundestag’s European Affairs Directorate drafts a first 
proposal on what documents to refer (prioritisation) 
and to which committees (lead committee and other 
committees in advisory capacity). The suggestion is 
then forwarded to the Chairman of the EAC, who drafts 
a formal proposal on the selection of documents for 
scrutiny and the responsible committees in agreement 
with the other committee chairs. The final decision is 
taken by the President of the Bundestag in agreement 
with the parliamentary secretaries (parlamentarische 
Geschäftsführer) of the parliamentary party groups. Al-
though the process is mainly paper-based, it still takes 
about four weeks31. The selected documents then need 
to be put on the agenda of the responsible committees. 
Once the lead committee has debated the document, 
made a proposal for an opinion or resolution and has 
given the other committees involved (especially the 
EAC) the opportunity to comment, the draft opinion/
resolution has to be put on the plenary agenda for a final 
decision (see §§ 93a – 93c Bundestag Standing Orders). 
In the Nationalrat, in contrast, the procedures are much 
leaner (Auel 2016). After a first purely legal assessment 
by the parliamentary administration, the political rele-
vance of these documents is assessed by the so-called 
‘group advisors’ of the parliamentary party groups, who 
also take the final decision on the documents to be put 
on the EAC’s agenda in a weekly meeting with the EU 
affairs staff (Miklin 2015). Although the Grand Commit-
tee of the Nationalrat is officially the main parliamen-
tary body dealing with EU affairs, most of the actual 
EU business has been delegated to the Subcommittee 
on EU affairs. Thus, once the prioritising and selection 
process is done, no further cooperation with other com-
mittees or involvement of the plenary are necessary.
31   See the timeline in COSAC 2010: 74.
5.4 Role of administrations to  
support parliaments 
Administrators are seen to play an important role in 
supporting MPs in the conduct of parliamentary scru-
tiny. But just as there is variation of parliamentary scru-
tiny across member states, the number and role of ad-
ministrators varies to a great extent (Högenauer and 
Christiansen 2015: 125). The ratio between how many 
staff members support MPs differs greatly. Here the 
German Bundestag is supported by a parliamentary 
staff that is seen as the most ‘resourceful’ of all national 
parliaments (Höing 2015: 201) with 6532 staff members 
for 598+33 MPs. This is in stark contrast with the Span-
ish parliament, where 6 administrators have to work for 
616 MPs. It almost goes without saying, however, that 
the quality of staff does not ‘just depend on numbers’ 
(Högenauer and Christiansen 2015: 125). The Czech 
Upper house has 7 officials supporting 81 MPs and as 
mentioned above, further administrative support is 
provided by a Parliamentary Institute, but high turno-
ver rates prevail and staff are seen to have little work 
experience (Hrabálek and Strelkov 2015: 499). 
The fact that administrators are to be ‘neutral’ and work 
for all political groups is advocated in a majority of the 
member states (Högenauer and Neuhold 2015). The 
Swedish Riksdag is just one example. As pointed out 
on the parliamentary website the officials are non-polit-
ical appointees, which implies that they assist all eight 
parties in the Riksdag. Furthermore, they are not per-
mitted to favour any particular party. They retain their 
jobs even if there is a new political majority following 
an election (http://www.riksdagen.se/en/committees/
the-parliamentary-committees-at-work/). In Germany, 
however, in contrast to other member states, the liai-
son office in Brussels has a partisan dimension. The 
Brussels office was seen as a tool to enhance the con-
tacts to the German parliamentary groups in the EP. 
Staff members are accordingly partly selected by the 
parliamentary parties.
If we then look at the role attributed to administra-
tors in supporting MPs in the parliamentary scrutiny 
in EU affairs, then we find that administrators play a 
role in the selection and prioritization of Commission 
proposals and recommendation of instruments to be 
used. The final choice of instruments and decisions is, 
however, taken by MPs themselves (Högenauer and 
Neuhold 2015). 
32   Since January 2018, see: https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textar-
chiv/2013/47765815_kw47_ua_europa/214002
33   The number of MPs in the Bundestag varies due to the existence of surplus 
seats. Until the last election in September 2017, it had 631 MPs, and it cur-
rently has 709 members.
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In Austria, interestingly, the selection is made by both 
administrative and political staff. Administrators work-
ing within the administration of parliament (Parlaments-
direktion) check whether a proposal might violate the 
subsidiarity principle but do so purely on legal grounds. 
The political ‘screening’ is then carried out normally by 
party staff working for the political groups 34 The par-
liamentary administration also plays a role in setting 
the agenda of the EAC meetings by way of drawing up 
a list of proposals that might be problematic in the light 
of the subsidiarity principle. The agenda is agreed upon 
by the political groups consensually but they usually 
follow the advice provided by administrators (Miklin 
2015: 396).
A similar phenomenon can be observed in Germany, 
where members of the parliamentary administration 
carry the main responsibility to prioritize EU docu-
ments together with parliamentary parties. Note that in 
2013, the EU unit in the Bundestag administration was 
extended into a ‘full-fledged’ subdivision of the Bun-
destag administration (PE). A new section inside this 
subdivision has been created for ‘analysis, counselling 
and prioritization’, which is responsible to transmit the 
EU documents to the permanent committees. It is as-
sisted by the liaison office of the Bundestag in Brussels. 
As such this sub-division is ‘the crucial actor in EU af-
fairs within the Bundestag administration’ (Buche and 
Fleischer 2015: 9). 
In Sweden where, as pointed out, committees play an 
important role, each committee has its own secretar-
iat. This is headed by a committee secretary and en-
compasses between five and ten officials. The officials 
assist the members in drafting their proposals for deci-
sions, where the Riksdag then takes the final decision. 
The officials also play a role in drafting statements on 
EU green and white papers and other EU documents. 
Again these are then debated and decided on in the 
Chamber. 35
34   Each political group has at least one official working primarily on EU affairs.
35   See: http://www.riksdagen.se/en/committees/the-parliamentary-com-
mittees-at-work/
The administration of the Dutch Lower House, the 
Swedish parliament and the French parliament gen-
erally try to provide committees with balanced argu-
ments on an issue. Note that the administration of the 
Romanian House of Representatives provides an anal-
ysis only upon request. In the case of the Dutch Lower 
House, officials try to provide MPs with balanced ar-
guments in an attempt to get politicians more actively 
involved in the scrutiny of EU affairs (Högenauer and 
Neuhold 2015). 
Most parliamentary administrations however only pro-
vide summaries of documents or a list of different argu-
ments and usually only draft parliamentary documents 
after the debates in the committees. The staff of the Ger-
man Bundesrat, for example, drafts reasoned opinions 
based on the debates in the Bundesrat. In rare cases par-
liamentary administrations already provide drafts prior 
to debates in the committee, for example the European 
Affairs clerks of the Belgian House of Representatives, 
the Romanian Senate and the Polish Sejm, as well as 
the French parliamentary administration for reasoned 
opinions or the Slovak parliament upon request of the 
chair (Högenauer and Neuhold 2015).
The Czech Parliament, finally, is seen to have especially 
good access to early information through its adminis-
tration (Hrabálek and Strelkov 2015: 499; Wessels et.al. 
2013: 33): Staff of both chambers (typically the head or 
deputy head of EU unit in each chamber) participate 
directly in the government’s EU Committee, the exec-
utive coordination mechanism. While the final position 
is approved at the ministerial level, they can attend, as 
associate members, the meetings at the working level, 
where the government position for the European Coun-
cil is prepared and discussed intensively. In addition, 
the staff of both Houses have access to the internal, 
non-public database and thus to all Council working 
group data or COREPER meeting information. As a 
result, the Czech Parliament has broad, and especially 
early, access to information on all EU issues. 
6. Bringing it all together: a comparative analysis 
As the study shows, when it comes to the policy shaping 
role, we find a strong variation between parliaments and 
chambers. The parliaments of Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden, famous for their EU scrutiny provisions, are 
indeed among the most active ‘policy-shapers’ when it 
comes to issuing mandates or resolutions on EU docu-
ments or decisions. But the Dutch Tweede Kamer, both 
German chambers, the Baltic parliaments as well as the 
Slovakian parliament and the Slovenian Národná rada 
are also in this groups. 
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Another role that national parliaments increasingly take 
on, however, is that of public forum, by for example 
debating EU affairs in plenary (see section 3.4). Par-
liaments/chambers that invest a (comparatively) high 
percentage of their plenary time to debate EU topics 
are for example the Austrian, the German, the Finnish, 
the Hungarian, the Italian, the Luxembourgish and the 
Maltese parliament. The same holds true for the Czech 
Senate, the Dutch lower house and the UK House of 
Lords. The legislatures of Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Po-
land, Slovenia and Sweden fall into a medium category. 
The same can be observed for the Spanish Congress, 
the Romanian lower house, the Dutch upper house and 
for the UK House of Commons. Parliaments/chambers 
that do not spend a high percentage of their time on EU 
debates are the legislatures of Bulgaria, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Portugal and Cyprus. This is also the case in 
the Czech lower house and the Spanish Senate.
Looking at whether parliaments are active ‘European 
players’, the following picture emerges: under the EWS 
some upper houses are more active than ‘their’ lower 
houses, such as in Austria, the Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK. In the Netherlands this pic-
ture is reversed insofar as the Lower house is a more 
active user of the EWS than the upper house. In Poland 
both houses are rather active but as mentioned above, 
the uni-cameral Riksdag is in the lead when it comes to 
the EWS (see: section 4.1.2). Other active parliaments 
include that of Malta and Luxembourg. Not very active 
under the EWS are the Slovenian, Latvian legislature 
and the German Bundestag. 
As mentioned above, the Portuguese parliament is very 
active under the Political Dialogue. Other active cham-
bers include the Italian Senate or German Bundesrat 
(which are both much more active than the lower house). 
This trend is reversed in the UK, where the House of 
Commons is more active than the House of Lords. Par-
liaments such as the Austrian, the Danish, the Lithua-
nian, the Luxembourgish and the Polish Senate fall into 
the medium category. Not active under the Political 
Dialogue are parliaments such that of Slovenia, Bel-
gium, Hungary, Finland, Malta, Latvia, Cyprus, Malta, 
Estonia and Croatia. 
For national parliaments to be effective ‘European play-
ers’, inter-parliamentary cooperation is seen as a pre-
condition (see section: 4.1.4). The network of administra-
tive liaisons in Brussels is attributed an important role in 
a majority of national legislatures. Only in the Austrian 
(both houses) and in the Danish parliament and in the 
Belgian Senate and the Romanian lower house, it is of 
‘medium’ importance and resorted to accordingly. The 
same is true for Inter-Parliamentary Conferences such 
as COSAC, these are also attributed “high” importance 
and often resorted to in a majority of parliaments, ex-
cept in Austria, Spain, Denmark, the German Bundesrat, 
Ireland and the Polish Senate, the Slovenian Državni 
svet (where they play a medium role). When it comes 
to IPEX, yet again a rather similar picture emerges: in 
Austria and Denmark it is not the ‘top tool’ for informa-
tion exchange. The same is true for the Netherlands, 
Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Po-
land (lower house). Otherwise this mechanism is used 
frequently by the other legislatures.
To what extent does the activity of national parliaments 
depend on their institutional strength in EU affairs, on 
their administrative resources and infrastructure? How 
national parliaments engage in EU affairs is not simply 
a function of their institutional capacities (see Table 9). 
While there is indeed a strong relationship between in-
stitutional strength and parliamentary activity within 
the national arena (i.e. policy shaper), other activities, by 
contrast, such as engagement in IPC or activities within 
the EWS and the Political Dialogue, i.e. the instruments 
prevalent in the European arena as such, cannot simply 
be explained by institutional prerogatives. Of the most 
powerful parliaments, only the German Bundesrat, the 
Lithuanian Seimas, the Swedish Riksdag and the Dutch 
Tweede Kamer are also active in the EWS or the Po-
litical Dialogue, for example, while others such as the 
Danish Folketing, the Finnish Eduskunta, the German 
Bundestag or the Slovenian Državni zbor do not make 
much use of these instruments. 
When it comes to administrative support across parlia-
ments we also see no clear correlation between more 
active parliaments in EU affairs and the ratio of ad-
ministrators per MP (see section 5.4). While the Dutch 
Tweede Kamer, which is a rather active parliament in 
EU affairs, can build on a solid ratio of officials in rela-
tion to MPs, in the Portuguese parliament, which is so 
active under the Political Dialogue, 5 officials support 
230 MPs. Other parliaments that are not ‘well staffed’ in 
EU affairs (when it comes to the ratio MPs/official) the 
Austrian parliament (both chambers), or the Hungarian 
and Croatian parliament, yet their level of activity differs 
markedly. As alluded to above, especially the German 
Bundestag can build on a relatively large number of of-
ficials working for MPs. Other parliaments that fall into 
that category include the Czech Upper House, the leg-
islatures of Lithuania, Luxembourg and Cyprus as well 
as the Romanian and Polish Upper Houses – and thus 
again both rather active and less active parliaments.
The number of staff for support in EU affairs is also rath-
er closely related to the number of committees involved 
in European Affairs as well as their ‘jurisdictions’. As 
we have shown (section 5.4), the choice between one 
main committee dealing with EU affairs or the de-cen-
tralisation of EU scrutiny to a number of sectoral com-
mittees – mainstreaming – can have important trade-
offs. Parliaments that are “fully main-streamed”, i.e. 
where parliamentary scrutiny is fully decentralised to 
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standing committees, including the Dutch parliament 
(both houses), the French legislature (both houses) both 
chambers of the Italian and the German parliament. 
Further examples include Romania, Luxembourg and 
Sweden. An interesting case is the UK, where the House 
of Commons has a ESC that mainly has a scrutiny and 
filtering function, and ad hoc established European 
Committees that debate dossiers selected by the ESC. 
In the Czech Republic, Poland and Malta parliamentary 
scrutiny is concentrated within the EAC, while in Aus-
tria most of the actual scrutiny work is delegated to the 
EU sub-committee of the Main Committee.
In order to be effective scrutinisers, access to doc-
uments – especially to Council working group and 
COREPER as well as confidential documents – is also 
an important feature, in particular, when it comes to 
parliaments being able to play their role as government 
“watchdog” (see section 5.1). This is the case for the 
parliaments of Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, 
Germany, France, Sweden – and thus in parliaments 
that are in general rather active in EU affairs - but also 
holds true for the Spanish parliament (both houses). 
While Hungary, Estonia and Bulgaria have “medium” 
access to documents, the access in the UK (both hous-
es), Belgium (both houses), Malta and Greece is limited. 
Unsurprisingly, the study shows that there is no easy 
answer to the question of whether parliaments play an 
active role in EU affairs. Overall, we can find both ex-
tremely active chambers and scrutiny laggards – and 
a large field in between. However, the assessment de-
pends not only on an investigation of the level of their 
engagement in EU affairs, but also on the prior definition 
of what this role should consist of. Clearly, if parliamen-
tary influence on the government’s EU policy within the 
national arena is considered most important, the policy 
shapers perform especially well. Where, however, an as-
sessment takes the communication function of national 
parliaments into account, some of the policy shapers 
perform far less well. Only few parliaments, such as 
Czech Senate, the Dutch Tweede Kamer, the Finnish 
Eduskunta and both Chambers of the German Parlia-
ment score well on both criteria. The picture changes 
again once we take IPC or activities at the European lev-
el into account. Parliaments have thus developed their 
own distinct patterns of getting involved in EU affairs, 
emphasising different roles and arenas (see also Auel et 
al. 2015b). Yet two arguments can be made for further 
strengthening parliamentary participation rights in EU 
affairs: First, strong institutional prerogatives may be 
no guarantee, but they do enable parliaments to fulfil 
their roles. Second, as the introduction of the Political 
Dialogue as well as the EWS have demonstrated, pro-
viding parliaments with new instruments in EU affairs 
can lead to reforms of parliamentary procedures and 
increase MPs’ motivation to become engaged across 
different arenas. 
The study, however, also underlines that any assessment 
of parliamentary involvement also depends on the prior 
definition of what their role in the EU should consist of. 
If the domestic policy-influencing function (i.e. exerting 
influence on the government’s negotiation position) is 
considered most important, the policy shapers seem 
to perform especially well. Yet where an assessment 
takes the communication function of national parlia-
ments into account, policy shapers often perform less 
well; few chambers score highly on both types of ac-
tivity. Similarly, any assessment of the involvement of 
parliaments in the Political Dialogue or the EWS needs 
to consider whether such an engagement is indeed de-
sirable. As has been argued in the literature (De Wilde 
and Raunio 2015), focussing on these, so far also fairly 
ineffective, new instruments can be time consuming, 
thus binding scarce parliamentary resources and dis-
tracting parliaments from functions that some consider 
far more important, such as controlling the government 
and communicating EU politics to the citizens. This is 
also problematic if much of the scrutiny of documents 
is being delegated to the parliamentary administration, 
not least because the latter may lead to a bureaucrati-
sation rather than to a parliamentarisation or democ-
ratisation: ‘there is indeed the threat that an innovative 
procedure developed in order to respond to democratic 
legitimacy concerns, could become a purely bureau-
cratic routine. The “Political Dialogue” is sometimes 
neither political nor a dialogue’ (Rozenberg 2017: 24, 
see also Christiansen et al. 2014). 
To conclude, parliamentary involvement ought to help 
overcome what Lindseth (2010) has termed the ‘demo-
cratic disconnect’ - the ‘crucial disconnect ... between 
[citizens’, d.A.] perception of European governance 
as bureaucratic and distant, on the one hand, and at-
tachments to national institutions as the true loci of 
democratic and constitutional legitimacy, on the other’ 
(Lindseth 2010: 10). Any assessment of parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs – regardless of the arena or 
instruments used - thus needs to take into account the 
degree to which national parliaments provide a link 
between European politics and the citizens. 
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Table 7: Comparing Parliamentary Activity in EU Affairs
Member State
Mandates/
Resolutions1
Debates2 Ews3 Pd4 Ipc5 Ipc all
Liaison 
Officers in 
Brussels 
Conferences
Meetings
In EP
IPEX 
Austrian Bundesrat C A A B 1 1 1 1 C
Austrian Nationalrat B A C B 1 1 1 1 C
Belgian Chambre des 
représentants
C B B C 2 2 1 2 A
Belgian Sénat C B C C 1 2 2 1 B
Bulgarian Narodno sabranie B C B B 2 2 1 2 A
Croatian Hrvatski sabor - - C C 2 2 1 2 A
Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon C C C C 2 2 2 2 A
Czech Poslanecká sněmovna C C B B 2 2 1 2 A
Czech Senát A A B A 2 2 1 2 A
Danish Folketing A C B B 1 1 1 1 C
Dutch Eerste Kamer C B A B 2 2 1 2 A
Dutch Tweede Kamer A A A B 2 2 1 1 B
Estonian Riigikogu A B C C 2 2 1 1 B
Finnish Eduskunta A A C C 2 2 1 1 B
French Assemblée nationale C B C A 2 1 1 2 B
French Sénat B C A A 2 2 1 2 A
German Bundesrat A A B A 2 1 1 1 B
German Bundestag A A C B 2 2 1 1 B
Greek Vouli ton Ellinon C B C B 2 2 1 2 A
Hungarian Országgyűlés B A B C 2 2 2 1 A
Irish Houses of the Oireachtas C C B B 2 1 1 2 B
Italian Camera dei Deputati B A C A 2 2 2 2 A
Italian Senato della Repubblica B A A A 2 2 1 2 A
Latvian Saeima A C C C 2 2 1 1 B
Lithuanian Seimas A C A B 2 2 1 1 B
Luxembourg Chambre des 
Députés
B A A B 2 2 1 2 A
Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati C A A C 2 2 1 2 A
Polish Sejm B B A C 2 2 1 1 B
Polish Senat B B A B 2 1 1 2 b
Portuguese Assembleia da 
República
C C B A 2 2 1 2 A
Romanian Camera Deputaţilor B C B A 1 2 2 2 A
Romanian Senatul B B B A 2 2 2 2 A
Slovak Národná rada A C B C 2 2 1 2 A
Slovenian Državni svet C B C C 2 1 1 1 B
Slovenian Državni zbor A B C C 2 2 0 1 B
Spanish Cortes Generales B B A A 2 1 1 2 B
Spanish Senato B C - - 2 1 1 2 B
Swedish Riksdag A B A A 2 2 1 2 A
UK House of Commons B B B A 2 2 1 2 A
UK House of Lords C A A B 2 2 2 2 A
 
Note: A=high, B=medium, C=low activity. Sources: 1 2 based on OPAL data, see Auel et al. 2015a, 3 4 based on Annual Reports from the European 
Commission, online at https://ec.europa.eu/info/annual-reports-relations-national-parliaments_en,5 based on COSAC 2017a, 6 based on COSAC 2016a, 
here: 0=never, 1=sometimes, 2=very often
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Table 8: Institutional Prerogatives, Administrative Support and Infrastructure
Member State
Institutional 
strength1
Mainstreaming2
Priorities based 
on COM3
Access to 
documents4
Ratio admin/
MPs5
Rapporteurs6
Austrian Nationalrat and Bundesrat B C+ 0 A C C
Belgian Chambre des représentants C A 1 C B B
Belgian Sénat C A 0 C B C
Bulgarian Narodno sabranie C - 1 B B C
Croatian Hrvatski sabor - B 1 - C C
Cyprus Vouli ton Antiprosopon C A Intends to do so C A C
Czech Poslanecká sněmovna A B 1 A - C
Czech Senát A B 1 A A A
Danish Folketing A B 1 C C C
Dutch Eerste Kamer B A 1 C A C
Dutch Tweede Kamer A A 1 C A A
Estonian Riigikogu A C+ 0 B B C
Finnish Eduskunta A A 1 A - C
French Assemblée nationale B A 1 A B A
French Sénat B B 1 A B A
German Bundesrat A A 0 A A B
German Bundestag A A - A A A
Greek Vouli ton Ellinon C A 1 C B B
Hungarian Országgyűlés B B 1 B C A/B
Irish Houses of the Oireachtas C A Intends to do so V B C
Italian Camera dei Deputati B A Intends to do so B C A
Italian Senato della Repubblica B A 1 B B A
Latvian Saeima B C 1 B B C
Lithuanian Seimas A B 1 A A C
Luxembourg Chambre des Députés C A 0 C A A
Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati B B Intends to do so C B C
Polish Sejm B C 0 B C A
Polish Senat B C 1 B A C
Portuguese Assembleia da República B B Intends to do so B C
Romanian Camera Deputaţilor C B 1 C B A
Romanian Senatul C A 1 C A A
Slovak Národná rada B B 1 A B C
Slovenian Državni svet C A 0 C A C
Slovenian Državni zbor (lower) A C 1 C C C
Spanish Congreso C C 0 A C A
Swedish Riksdag A A 0 A - C
UK House of Commons B C+ 0 C B C
UK House of Lords B B 1 C B C
 
Sources: 1 based on OPAL Score Institutional Strength, see Auel et al. 2015a (A=strong, B=medium, C=weak); 2 based on COSAC (2017a) (A=fully 
mainstreamed, B=partially mainstreamed, C=not mainstreamed/C+= not mainstreamed, but EAC has subcommittee(s)); 3 based on COSAC (2016a) 
(1=yes, 0=no); 4 based on COSAC data, online at http://www.cosac.eu/eu-information/ (A= extensive access to documents, B=selective access to 
documents, C=limited access); 5 based on COSAC 2013a (Ratio= no of MPs/no of staff, a=low ratio, B=medium ratio, C=large ratio). As COSAC notes:’ In 
certain cases the replies were not fully comparable so there may be some understatement and/or overstatement in certain of the replies’ (2013a: 19); 6 
based on COSAC (2016a) (A=for every (important) EU dossier, B=one EU rapporteur per committee or parliamentary party group, C= no rapporteurs). 
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Appendix: Country Abbreviations
Belgium BE Lithuania LT
Bulgaria BG Luxembourg LU
Czech Republic CZ Hungary HU
Denmark DK Malta MT
Germany DE The Netherlands NL
Estonia EE Austria AT
Ireland IR Poland PL
Greece EL Portugal PT
Spain ES Romania RO
France FR Slovenia SI
Croatia HR Slovakia SK
Italy IT Finland FI
Republic of Cyprus CY Sweden SE
Latvia LV United Kingdom UK
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